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ABSTRACT

Massive migrationof Muslims to the West in recentyears has
raised the question whether Shari'a-Islamiclaw-should apply
to Muslim couples living in these countries. The issue is
particularlyacute when it comes to family life and the possibility
of using tort law in cases of harmful religiouspractices that are
permitted by Muslim law but are contrary to Western liberal
values. Using tort law as a soft solution, that is, taxing that
practice rather than banning it by criminal sanctions, may be a
balancedand efficient solution, at least in some cases. The Article
demonstrates this view-tax, don't ban-throughthe case of tort
compensation for talaq (repudiation;unilateral divorce against
the wife's will) in different countries for a comparative look.
This solution, which is used only in some countries, can serve
almost anywhere in the world to help accommodate religious
norms in a society that, in the name of multiculturalism, seeks
not to exclude minority groups and immigrants by rejecting their
customs and norms. Using tort law as a solution may allow a
society that holds Western values to cope with religious laws that
are incompatible with those values. Talaq is merely a test case.
The tort solution, which disincentivizes harmful but legitimate
Islamic family practices in a Western country, can be adapted to
other situations,such as bigamy, the refusal to grant a divorce in
the Jewish community, and more.

* Associate Professor, Bar-Ilan Law; Senior University Research Scholar, Yale Law
School, 2013-15; Visiting Professor, Duke Law School, 2006-08; Ph.D. 2005, L.L.M.
1999, L.L.B. 1998, Bar-Ilan University. I thank the participants of Bar-Ilan Law School
Seminar for their helpful comments and to Josh Divine, Moshe Phux, Julia G6etz, and
Shmuel Sussman for excellent research assistance. I wish to thank the members of
Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law for excellent work, and especially to Nicholas
Barnard, Kelly Flanagan, Janelle Grigaitis, Rebecka Manis, Matthew McKenna, Tara
Melillo, and Daniel Metzger.

VANDERBIL TJOURNAL OF TRANSNA TIONAL LAW

[VOL. 49.:989

TABLE OF CONTENTS
I.

II.

INTRODU CTION .....................................................
991
TALAQ: UNILATERAL DIVORCE AGAINST THE WIFE'S WILL
AND THE MECHANISM OF THE MAHR ................................

III.

COMPENSATION FOR REPUDIATED WIVES: BETWEEN
RELIGIOUS AND LIBERAL-CIVIL FAMILY LAWS .................

A.
B.

IV.

1001

1001

1004
1004
1004
1006
1013

TORT LAW AS A DESIRABLE AND COMPLEMENTARY BUT
INDEPENDENT SOFT SOLUTION .....................................
1013

A.
B.

C.
D.
E.
V.

The Dilem m a .......................................................
Compensation by Shari'aFamily Law (Mahr) vs.
Division of PropertyAccording to Liberal-Civil
F amily L aw .........................................................
1. Countries governed by Shari'aalone .........
2. Countries governed by Shari'ain
personal status only ...........................................
3. Countries governed by secular law
and not Shari'a...................................................
4. Sum m ary .....................................................

996

The Situation......................................................
1014
The Possible Use of Tort Law .............................
1015
1. Countries governed by Shari'a alone .........
1015
2. Countries governed by Shari'a in
personal status only ...........................................
1015
3. Countries governed by secular law
and not Shari'a:A case of legal pluralism ........
1018
Can Tort Law Indirectly Affect
PersonalStatus? ...................... . . .. . . .. . . .. . . . .. . . .. . . .. . .
1023
Compensation in Tort Law as a Remedy
for Breach of Autonomy ......................................
1025
Summary: Is Tort Action Possible, or Only the
Application of Civil or Religious Family Laws?
1026

G ENERALIZATION ..............................................................

A.

1027

Tort Law Provides an Indirect Disincentive to Act
According to Religiously Legitimate but Otherwise
Harmful Norms in the Family Arena ................
1027
B.
Using a Soft Law Solution: Tort Law as a Type of
Alternative for CriminalizingReligious IntraFamilial N orms ..................................................
1036
C.
Does the Use of Tort Law Create a
D istributionalProblem? ................ . . .. . . . .. . . .. . . .. . . . .
1038
D.
Is There Justificationfor Tort Law to Divide
the PropertyDifferently than Was Decided
Based on Family Law? ................. . . . .. . . .. . . . .. . . .. . . . .
1038
V I. C ONCLUSION .....................................................................
1040

20161

TAX, DON'T BAN

I. INTRODUCTION
The large migration of Muslims to the West 1 in recent years has
raised questions concerning the role of religious law in general, and of
Shari'ain particular: should Western states (and Muslim states whose
laws are secular) apply Shari'a to Muslim couples living in the
country? This question gained increased urgency in recent years,
especially following the lecture of the Archbishop of Canterbury at the
Royal Courts of Justice in 2008, entitled "Civil and Religious Law in
England: A Religious Perspective," and the debate that ensued
regarding applicability of Muslim law in one form or another in a
2
Western state.
The question is particularly acute when it comes to family life and
the possibility of using tort law in cases of harmful religious practices
that are permitted by Muslim law but are contrary to liberal values. A
soft solution of taxing these practices without banning them through
criminal sanctions may be a balanced and efficient solution, at least in
some cases.
This Article discusses the possibility of using tort law to tax rather
than ban certain practices in Muslim family life. The focus is on a test
case derived from family law, but the Article generalizes the conclusion
to a wide range of situations.
The Article focuses on the property rules of Shari'a,which were
ostensibly agreed upon by the spouses, but clearly deprive one of the
parties, usually the woman, of her rights. Often the agreement does
not reflect a true consent of both parties, but rather a traditional
document that is a condition for marriage in the Muslim community,

1.
See, e.g., The Future of the Global Muslim Population,PEW RESEARCH GROUP
(Jan. 27, 2011), http://www.pewforum.org/2011/O1/27/future-of-the-global-muslimpopulation-regional-europe/ [https://perma.cc/T27S-MLKL] (archived Sept. 12, 2016)
(indicating that the number of Muslims in Europe has grown from 29.6 million in 1990
to 44.1 million in 2010); Besheer Mohamed, A New Estimate of the U.S. Muslim
Population, PEW
RESEARCH
CENTER:
FACT
TANK
(Jan.
6,
2016),
http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2016/01/06/a-new-estimate-of-the-u-s-muslimpopulation! [https:/lperma.cc/25KG-YQRT] (archived Sept. 12, 2016) (showing a big
increase in Muslim population in the U.S.); Immigration and EthnoculturalDiversity in
Canada, STATISTICS CANADA, https://wwwl2.statcan.gc.ca/nhs-enm/2011/as-sa/99-010x/99-010-x2011001-eng.cfm#a2 (last visited Sept. 28, 2016) [https://perma.cc/8ZRR5HC8] (archived Sept. 12, 2016) (describing how in 2011, just over 1 million individuals
identified themselves as Muslim on the NHS in Canada. They represented 3.2 percent
of the nation's total population, up from 2 percent recorded in the 2001 Census).
2.
For the text of the Archbishop's lecture, see Rowan Williams, Civil and
Religious Law in England:A Religious Perspective, 10 ECCLESIASTICAL L.J. 262 (2008).
On the debate see for example Bernard Jackson, 'TransformativeAccommodation' and
Religious Law, 11 ECCLESIASTICAL L.J. 131 (2009). For a discussion on the question see
generally infra Section V.A; MUSLIM FAMILY LAW IN WESTERN COURTS (Elisha Giunchi
ed., 2014).
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such that, without signing it, the couple cannot have a Muslim
religious marriage. The mahr is a type of prenuptial agreement that
grants the woman a relatively small, symbolic gift, usually in the
amount of several thousand dollars, in the case of divorce. This final
gift exhausts all her rights. This arrangement, which is not truly based
on agreement but rather on accepted tradition, prevents the wife from
obtaining her equal right in -the common property, as she might under
the family laws of the Western country where the couple live at the
time of the divorce. This remains the case even if the couple has been
3
living for many years in a state that does not observe Muslim laws.
Acceptance of the mahr, which is based on Shari'a,leaves the woman
practically a pauper in cases of divorce, because, in the Muslim
tradition, there is no alimony.4 The question becomes even more acute
if the divorce is done by means of talaq (unilateral divorce or
repudiation). In this instance, the divorce is not agreed upon and not
the result of a suit filed in the Shari'a court, but rather is against the
wife's will and outside the court, in a unilateral move on the part of the
husband. 5
Application of religious norms by legal systems of the state is
highly problematic in countries that have retained colonial-era
practices. This is because these countries apply only a portion of
religious law, that is, religious family law, which does not support
individualism and fundamental human rights in the same way that
liberal laws do. 6 In some countries, such as Israel, Lebanon, and India,
religious laws constitute state law in matters of divorce, and therefore
there is no separation between church and state in matters of marriage
and divorce.7 In other countries, such as the United States, religious
laws constitute non-state law, but cases of divorce may be adjudicated
before the private courts of various religions, with their judgments at
times enforced by state courts. These private-religious courts have the
authority to issue orders (e.g., that the husband should divorce his
wife), but they lack the power to enforce them. In the present case,
these private courts will confirm that talaq ends the marriage and
prevents the woman from returning to her husband, who divorced her
unilaterally.8 Many Western societies still operate under a system in

3.
4.
5.

See infra Part II.
See infra Parts II and III.
See infra Part II.

6.
See generally YUKSEL SEZGIN, HUMAN RIGHTS UNDER STATE-ENFORCED
RELIGIOUS FAMILY LAWS IN ISRAEL, EGYPT AND INDIA (2013); ISLAMIC FAMILY LAW IN A

CHANGING WORLD: A GLOBAL RESOURCE BOOK, (Abdullahi An-Nai'm ed., 2002); PINHAS
SHIFMAN, FAMILY LAW IN ISRAEL (1988); Adam S. Hofri-Winogradow, A Plurality of

Discontent:Legal Pluralism,Religious Adjudication and the State, 26 J.L. & RELIG. 57
(2010); Ayelet Blecher-Prigat & Benjamin Shmueli, The Interplay Between Tort Law and
Religious Family Law: The Israeli Case, 26 ARIZ. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 279 (2009).
7.
See infra Subsection III.B.2.
8.
See infra Subsection III.B.3.
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which churches have a formally established status in the state. 9 In
some Arab-Muslim countries, religious law (Shari'a)is the state law
that governs all areas of life. 10 In the United States, the situation is
different, and there is separation between church and the state;
similarly, in the United Kingdom, although there is no clear-cut
separation, the society is a liberal one, and state courts are secular.' 1
The question of the application of religious norms by legal systems
of the state gains poignancy with regard to issues of personal status.
Increased migration in different countries, some of them involving
Muslim migrants, has raised the question of pluralism and
multicultural family law in non-Muslim countries. 12 The increasingly
"deinstitutionalized" formation of family law in some countries is in
conflict with the family-personal law, which is tied to the religious
(state or non-state) law of Muslim immigrants. 13 Greater mobility of
the population, combined with the increasing secularization of some
Western nations, has brought Western law and Shari'a into more
pronounced conflict. 14 Western secularization clashes with the Muslim
law brought in by the immigrants, 15 leading to conflicts in a variety of
situations.
An illustrative case is one in which the divorce is unilateral on the
part of the husband-talaq-whichcauses emotional distress to the
woman and damages her ability to remarry. 16 According to Shari'a,
this is a legitimate, even if undesirable, act, enabling the husband to
divorce his wife outside of a court of law and without having to file suit,
by repeating three times, on different occasions, the statement "you are
divorced."17
In the case of Muslim states where Shari'a is the law of the land,
this is the end of the road as far as a woman who was divorced against
her will is concerned. But if the divorce is conducted in a court of law,
which is another of the husband's options and the proper course of
action, the woman has a chance for an arrangement that better
protects her rights, perhaps even for reconciliation or a genuine
agreement between the parties regarding the divorce and the
property.' 8 In states where Shari'ais not the law of the land, or at least
not the only law, the woman who was divorced against her will can go

9.

CHRISTIAN JOPPKE & JOHN TORPEY, LEGAL INTEGRATION OF ISLAM 17 (2013).

10.
11.

See infra Subsection III.B.1.
See infra Subsection III.B.3.

12.
See generally ANDREA BUCHLER, IsLAMIc LAW IN EUROPE? LEGAL PLURALISM
AND ITS LIMITS IN EUROPEAN FAMILY LAWS (2013) (describing mostly the situation in

European countries).
13. Id. at 2.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. See infra Part IV.
17. See infra Part II.
18. See infra Subsection III.B.1.
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to court in an attempt to obtain a division of the property in addition
to the mahr or instead of it, although the mahr is supposed to settle
the issue of compensation in all its forms. 19 In most cases, the legal
debates in the civil courts of these countries concern immigrants who
signed the mahr in a Muslim state and later immigrated to a Western
country. In these cases, the husband insists on observing the mahr,
whereas the wife seeks a division of property according to modern
Western family law. The debate, therefore, involves mostly the
authority and observance of the laws of other countries, which at times
makes it possible to recognize religious norms even when they are
contrary to modern law, even if the debate takes place in a country
where church and state are separated. 20 The outcomes differ in various
countries, depending, among other factors, on the degree of separation
21
between church and state.
In certain countries, a tort claim for talaq is recognized so that,
although talaq is legitimate from the point of view of Shari'a,it has a
civil price, and sometimes even a criminal one, as in the case of bigamy
or polygamy. 22 Because pecunia non olet (money has no smell), and the
woman receiving it has little concern regarding its source,
compensation by way of tort law in practice divides the property by a
different means and improves the economic condition of the woman.
For some reason, other countries do not use this device. In Muslim
countries where Shari'arules in all domains of law, including tort law,
a court would not rule that an act in family law according to Shari'a
represents a tort according to Shari'a.23 Therefore, this solution is
viable only in Western countries and in Muslim countries where
Shari'a does not hold absolute sway, or where it applies in personal
law but not in civil law, as is the case in Israel, Lebanon, and India.
Because in these countries tort law is not subordinated to family law,
the compensation for damages is not at the expense of the mahr or of
the division of property, but is a supplementary step aimed at
improving the situation of the woman and at deterring husbands from
unilateral divorce in the future. This is particularly important in
Western and Muslim countries where Shari'a is supreme, where the
woman does not have the option to divide the property fairly and must
accept the symbolic compensation of the mahr. But the argument in
this Article is that the tort compensation is important and applicable
also in countries that do entitle women to a division of the property,
because the two are separate remedies provided by different systems:

19.
20.
21.
22.
23.

See
See
See
See
See

infra Subsections IJI.B.2 and 3.
infra Subsection 111.B.3.
infra Subsections 11I.B.4.
infra Subsection TV.B.2.
infra Subsection 1V.B.1.
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the tort compensation is for the emotional damage that talaq has
caused, for which family law provides no compensation.
It may be possible to argue that tort law should not be applied if
the parties agreed contractually on the mahr. This argument must be
rejected, however, because the compensation is in a different domain
(this is in addition to the argument that the agreement is not a genuine
one on the part of the woman who signs the mahr agreement when she
enters the marriage because in practice she has no choice). The tort
mechanism that needs to be expanded to many other countries
explains why it is possible to state that the divorce is valid from the
point of view of religious family law but that, at the same time, a tort
has been committed for which compensation must be paid.
To generalize, a country that chooses not to apply the rules of
Shari'a, not even those that have been accepted by consent between
the parties, does so for reasons of individualism and in order to protect
the rights of people injured by the application of the religious norms,
especially people who did not genuinely agree to these norms, even if
they appear to have done so. The option to resort to tort law enables
the legal system that chooses to honor the rules of Shari'ain cases such
as talaq to approve the existence of mahr and at the same time ensure
that women can achieve their rights in some form, not by way of family
law but by way of tort law. This does not circumvent religious family
law because it takes place on a separate track, which makes possible
the exhaustion of rights of a different type, in this case, compensation
for emotional damage as a result of the unilateral divorce. In such a
case, the state can have it both ways: it does not have to confront head
on Shari'a rules that have been accepted by agreement, and can still
enable persons injured by the application of these religious laws to
realize their rights indirectly but still legitimately. In this way, the
state provides an indirect incentive not to commit injurious religious
acts, even if they are legitimate from the point of view of religious law.
It is a negative incentive of a financial nature that does not directly
confront personal law. As such, it can serve as a subtle and soft solution
to the delicate problem of accommodating religious norms in a society
whose laws are not based on such religious norms, but which, in the
name of multiculturalism, wishes not to exclude minority groups and
immigrants by rejecting their customs and norms.24
The Article proceeds as follows: In Part II the reality of talaq
(unilateral divorce) is discussed. In Part III the various comparative
models for compensating women who were divorced against their will
through religious family law and through civil-secular family law are
described. The focus is on the dilemma between accepting the
contractual arrangement of the mahr, according to which the woman

24.

See infra Section V.A.
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who was divorced against her will is left with a symbolic final
compensation, and rejecting the arrangement in favor of a fair and
equitable division of property according to Western civil-family law.
Part IV focuses on the soft, intermediate solution of the civil-tort claim
for the damages of talaq for a comparative look. This successful,
balanced solution, which is used only in certain countries, can serve as
a complementary solution almost anywhere in the world. Thus, a
Muslim woman who was unilaterally divorced against her will is
entitled to damages for her emotional distress, even if the property is
distributed according to liberal family values. Part V generalizes and
explains that talaq can serve as a test case for the deployment of
religious laws such as Shari'a within the legal systems of Western
countries. Recognition of the tort claim can serve as an intermediate
path whereby countries that do not wish to directly confront a religious
norm agreed upon by the parties can provide economic incentives hot
to commit certain acts and in this way fight against these norms
indirectly and effectively. Talaq is merely an example. The model
presented can be adapted to other situations, such as polygamy and
the refusal to grant a divorce in the Jewish community, among others.
The use of tort law not only complements family law and
compensates for what family law is incapable of doing, but also
provides a convenient solution for states that choose not to confront
religious norms through criminal law. Even if explicit offenses exist
against talaq or polygamy, enforcement is scarce. In the tort track, the
state hands the injured party-the woman-the reins to apply a type
of private enforcement in the form of a disincentive to commit the
undesired act.

II. TALAQ: UNILATERAL DIVORCE AGAINST THE WIFE'S WILL AND THE
MECHANISM OF THE MAHR

A Muslim husband telling his wife in the presence of witnesses
that he divorces her (talaq), is a legitimate act according to Shari'a.25
There are several ways to dissolve a marriage under domestic Muslim
law. One of them is talaq, which allows the husband to end a marriage

25.
See Qur'an2:226-27 (discussing Islamic rules of divorce); JAMAL J. NASIR, THE
ISLAMIC LAW OF PERSONAL STATUS 106 (3d ed. 2002) (explaining that the most common
form of divorce is the unilateral divorce of repudiation by the husband).
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unilaterally, 26 by telling his wife three times that she is repudiated. 27
The repudiation is usually accomplished when a man utters an
unequivocal phrase, such as "You are divorced," "My wife is
divorced, '28 "I divorce thee [name of the wife]," 29 or simply says the
''30
word "talaq.
In some countries, the legislature retained this mode of dissolving
a marriage, but specified clearly that, to exercise his right, the husband
must obtain court authorization. This allows the wife to be heard in
court and guarantees not only her rights, but also those of the couple's
children.3 1 In several countries, the court grants authorization to draw
up a talaq only if the husband has submitted to the court clerk's office
a fixed sum of money, in an amount determined by the court, covering
32
the rights of the spouse.
Talaq is an unequal and discriminatory practice because it is the
husband's exclusive right; women do not have a comparable right to

26. See Qur'an 2:229 (defining "talaq". The man is no longer married to a woman
after he has pronounced divorce three times). See, e.g., Moussa Abou Ramadan, The
Shari'a in Israel: Islamization, Israelization and the Invented Islamic Law, 5 UCLA J.
ISLAMIC & NEAR E. L. 81, 110 (2005-2006) ('Marriage is made by consent and
agreement of an adult and sane woman, and according to the Hanafi Law, a husband
can dissolve the marriage without his wife's agreement. Most of the effort of the Hanafi
religious scholars was spent on deciding the type of phrases that can lead to divorce.
Even divorce by joking, divorce by coercion, and divorce by a drunkard can be valid
divorces.") (citations omitted).
27.
Martha C. Nussbaum, International Human Rights Law in Practice: India:
Implementing Sex Equality Through Law, 2 CHI. J. INT'L L. 35, 44 (2001) (describing
domestic laws in India).
28. Dan E. Stigall, Iraqi Civil Law: Its Sources, Substance, and Sundering, 16 J.
TRANSNAT'L L. & POL'Y 1, 53 (2006) (describing domestic laws in Iraq, and referring to
MAJEED HAMAD AL-NAJJAR, ISLAM JAFARI RULES OF PERSONAL STATUS AND
RELATED RULES OF IRAQIAN LAW 109 (1978)).
29. Aleem v. Aleem, 947 A.2d 489, 490 (Md. 2008).
30. Martin Lau, Pakistan, 12 Y.B. ISLAMIC & MIDDLE E. L. 443, 454 n.8 (2006)
("The husband pronounces three times the word "talaq," which means repudiation, and
thereby divorces his wife irrevocably."); Sylvia Tamale, Law Reform and Women's Rights
in Uganda, 1 E.AFR. J. PEACE & HUM. RTS. 164, 173-74 (1993) ("[A] Muslim man may,
at his will and without the intervention of the courts, divorce his wife by simply
pronouncing the word talaq three times.").
31.
See, e.g., Marie-Claire Foblets, Moroccan Women in Europe: Bargainingfor
Autonomy, 64 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1385, 1391-92 (2007) (presenting the new
Moudawana in Morocco, which adds several options previously unavailable under the
former Code); Elsje Bonthuys & Tshepo Mosikatsanat, Law of Persons and Family Law,
2000 ANN. SURV. S. AFER. L. 128, 131 (2000) (discussing Muslim Personal Law in South
Africa).
32. See Foblets, supra note 31, at 1392 (referring to art. 83 of the Moroccan Family
Code (2004) and explaining that the rights of the wife are specified in art. 84: balance of
the sadaq or dowry, if any; maintenance owing for the legal waiting period; and a
"Consolation Gift"). According to art. 85, the husband must also give an amount to cover
child support payments. Id.
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unilaterally end a marriage. 33 There are, however, a few forms of talaq
that grant the wife a similar right, and some forms that enable the
husband to unilaterally divorce his wife but offer her compensation
within family law. 34 For example, in Morocco, there can be talaq by
mutual consent; 35 tamlik, which means a talaq ensuing from a right to
choose, assigned by a husband to his wife; 36 or khol/khul' , divorce by
the wife in exchange for compensation to the husband. 37 But, as MarieClaire Foblets explains, even in such cases, it is the will of the man
that is taken into consideration in the first instance. 38 In other

33.
See Tamale, supra note 30, at 173-74 ("Sharia law permits dissolution of
marriage where the marriage has irretrievably broken down. However, it is the method
of effecting such dissolution which is discriminatory, as it is the unilateral right of the
man. Thus, a Muslim man may, at his will and without the intervention of the courts,
divorce his wife by simply pronouncing the word talaq three times. This has led to so
many arbitrary divorces among the Muslim community as it permits men to discard their
wives at will without giving women the corresponding right to divorce their husbands. A
Muslim woman can only be granted a divorce from her husband when the latter is in
agreement, i.e. through mutual consent. These double standards sanctioned by the legal
regime only perpetuate the inferior status of women.").
34.
Foblets, supra note 31, at 1392 (referring to art. 124 of the Moroccan Family
Code and explaining that this is contrary to the situation under the former Moroccan
Family Code).
35. Id. (referring to art. 114 of the Moroccan Family Code: "The spouses may
mutually agree on the principle of ending their conjugal relationship with or without
conditions, provided that the conditions do not contradict the provisions of this
Moudawana, and do not harm the children's interests.").
36.
Id. (referring to art. 89 of the Moroccan Family Code: "If the husband has
assigned his right of repudiation to his wife, she can exercise this right by petitioning
the court according to the [repudiation] provisions .... Foblets explains that
"[rjepudiation is granted to the wife by a clause inserted in the marriage contract, or
possibly by the consent of the husband after the dispute has begun.").
37.
Id. at 1392-93 (referring to art. 115 of the Moroccan Family Code: "The spouses
may agree on divorce in exchange for compensation according to the provisions of [the
divorce by mutual consent]"). Foblets explains that in this type of talaq, "[r]epudiation
is made by the husband at the wife's request and in return for compensation." Id. at
1393.
38.
Id. at 1393 ("The situation regarding divorce referred to as irrevocable
breakdown is different in the new Moudawana. The new Code authorizes a woman who
wishes to end the marriage to file a petition before the court for divorce for
chiqaq ...

unofficial English translation: 'for irreconcilable differences' ....

The court is

obliged, in such cases, to grant and pronounce the divorce within a maximum of six
months of the date of the petition, 'taking into account each spouse's responsibility for
the cause of the separation when considering measures it will order the responsible party
to take in favour of the other spouse.' Could this new provision be regarded as being, for
women, what repudiation is for men? The answer to this question will have to come from
practice. Some judges consider this form of divorce to be a variant of divorce for fault, in
which case the courts have a discretionary power to evaluate the admissibility of the
petition and to set an amount owing as compensation for the damages suffered by the
husband because the wife is responsible for the break-up of the marriage. Such an
interpretation clearly makes divorce more difficult for women. If it turns out that in
practice this interpretation prevails, one would be obliged to conclude that the shiqaq
does not constitute an equivalent of the talaq. In that case, this new form of divorce
would be closer to a legal separation with compensation-a concept that nevertheless
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countries, the wife may obtain rights similar to talaq by way of talaqi-tafwidltalaq-al-tafwid, which is a delegated divorce. Finally, a
husband may allow his wife to exercise talaq, and since the traditional
female-initiated divorce is permissible only under certain strict
conditions, this delegated form of talaq is a way of granting the same
rights of divorce to both spouses. 9 Clauses concerning this type of
divorce are regularly included in marriage contracts in some countries,
including Egypt, 40 India, 41 Pakistan, 42 Bangladesh, 43 Morocco, 44
46
Nigeria, 45 and Indonesia.
In countries such as Morocco, where talaq is revocable, the
47
husband may take back his wife, but only with her express consent.
In Egypt, as in most legal traditions, there is a concept of triple talaq,
and if the husband repudiates his wife only once, it is revocable, that
is, it counts as talaq but it is not yet final, 48 and marital relations are
merely suspended for the waiting period (idda), during which the wife
is not permitted to marry another man. 49 This kind of divorce is

does not exist in the Code-whenever the wife fails to convince the court of the sincerity
of her request.") (internal citations omitted).
39. Bonthuys & Mosikatsanat, supra note 31, at 131 ("According to Muslim
Personal Law a husband may dissolve a marriage by pronouncing a Talaq, while a wife
may obtain similar rights by way of Talaq-I-Tafwid.").
40. See RON SHAHAM, FAMILY AND THE COURTS IN MODERN EGYPT: A STUDY
BASED ON DECISIONS BY THE SHARI'A COURTS 1900-1955 106-07 (1997).

41.
See Narendra Subramanian, Legal Changeand Gender Inequality: Changes in
Muslim Family Law in India, 33 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 641, 641 (2008); Sylvia Vatuk,
Islamic Feminism in India: Indian Muslim Women Activists and the Reform of Muslim
Personal Law, 42 MOD. ASIAN STUD. 489, 505 (2008).
42.
See Muslim Family Law Ordinance, No. XIII of 1961, PAK. CODE
http://www.refworld.org/docid/4c3flelc2.html [https://perma.cc/LN5P-AUEM] (archived
Sept. 13, 2016).
43.
See Muslim Marriage & Divorce Registration Act, (Act No. LII of 1974), § 6
[Bangl.]
http://bdlaws.minlaw.gov.bd/sections-detail.php?id=476&sections id=12227
[https://perma.cc/B75H-8H5S] (archived Sept. 13, 2016).
44. See Moroccan Family Code (Moudawana), art. 89 (Feb. 5, 2004),
http://www.hrea.org/moudawana.html#24 [Morrocco].
45.

See J.

NORMAN

D. ANDERSON,

ISLAMIC LAW IN AFRICA

213 (2013)

(explaining that delegated divorce exists also in Nigeria, but it is very rare. Divorce is
more often initiated by the wife than by the husband, but usually by khul', in which case
it is the husband who is compensated (and the woman usually renounces her mahr).
46.

See JOHN RICHARD BOWEN, ISLAM, LAW AND EQUALITY IN INDONESIA: AN

ANTHROPOLOGY OF PUBLIC REASONING 205 (2003) (explaining that the marriage
contract in Indonesia may list certain actions that trigger talaq if the husband carries
them out. The main difference is that it is not considered the woman's decision, although
in practice she may initiate the divorce proceedings).
47.
See, e.g., Foblets, supra note 31, at 1392 (referring to art. 124 of the Moroccan
Family Code).
48.

See SHAHAM, supra note 40, at 101.

49. Id. at 101, 140-41 ("One of the legal effects of divorce (or of the husband's
death) is the waiting period, during which the divorced woman is not permitted to marry
another man. The purposes of this period are to enable the divorcing husband to consider
calmly the implications of his act and perhaps retreat from it; to make sure that the
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referred to as taldq raj' i. 50 It means the husband can take his wife
back by saying so explicitly, or by his actions after such a divorce and
before the end of the waiting period. If the waiting period has expired,
the spouses can remarry by drafting a new marriage contract,
including mahr. 51 After repudiating his wife for the third time,
however, the divorce becomes irrevocable (t alaq ba' in), 52 and the
spouses cannot remarry until after the wife has been married to
another man and their marriage has ended. 53 There is also suspended
divorce (taldq mu' allaq), which is dependent on a specific condition
being met, for example, "If you buy this dress, you are divorced. '54
If talaq is acknowledged by the civil court and is declared valid,
and in any case of valid Muslim divorce, the court can order the
husband to pay damages to his ex-wife from the mahr (referred to also
as mehr/meher/mahrieh)(dower). The mahr is a gift from the husband
to the wife for entering into the marriage and an integral component
of every Islamic marriage contract, unless the woman expressly forfeits
her right to it. 55 As a gift from the man to his wife, it is in theory hers
as soon as the marriage contract comes into effect, but it often passes
into her possession only when the marriage ends. The mahr's amount

divorcee (or the widow) is not pregnant (to prevent future difficulties in establishing the
paternity of a baby born to her); and to demonstrate the high moral value of the marriage
bond. A divorcee's duty to observe the waiting period is conditional upon her marriage
having been consummated, while a widow has to observe the waiting period whether her
marriage was consummated or not."). See also, id. ('The waiting period of a pregnant
woman ends when she gives birth, while that of other women at the age of fertility lasts
three menstrual periods. For minors or women above the climacteric (sinn al-yas, which
is fifty five years according to the majority Hanafi view), the waiting period lasts three
lunar months. It should be mentioned that if an older woman argues that she still
menstruates, her version is accepted (i.e., her waiting period is calculated by menstrual
cycles) unless her previous husband can establish the opposite. A widow's waiting period
lasts four months and ten days.").
50. Id. at 101 ("If the divorce is revocable (raj 'i), the husband has a right to return
the divorcee to conjugal life during the waiting period against her will and without
having to conclude a new marriage contract.").
51. Id.
52. Id. ("If the divorce is irrevocable (ba'in), in order to resume conjugal life with
her the husband has to get his ex-wife's approval to conclude a new marriage with him,
and to pay her a new dower.").
53. Id. ("Up to the third repudiation it is relatively simple for the husband to
reclaim his divorced wife. Following the third divorce, however, the Qur'an instructs that
the divorced wife must go through a process called tahlil to be permitted in marriage to
her ex-husband: first, she has to consummate an intermediate marriage with another
man, and only after she is divorced or widowed is she again permitted to her ex-husband.
This mechanism was meant to deter a husband from hastily divorcing his wife.").
54.

Id.

55.
Regarding the question whether the mahr resembles alimony or prenuptial
agreement, see Shiva Falsafi, Religion, Women, and the Holy Grail of Legal Pluralism,
35 CARDOZO L. REV. 1881, 1884 (2014) (distinguishing it from a dowry, "which in some
cultures is brought by the bride to the marriage," and referring to RAJ BHALA,
UNDERSTANDING ISLAMIC LAW (SHARI'A) § 35.02[A] (2011)). See also infra Subsection
III.B.3.
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is usually determined by the husband's financial means and the wife's
social status, and in this respect it arguably fulfills the same role as
alimony, which is not part of traditional Islamic law. 56 In this case, the
woman need not prove anything or bring any action to win the mahr.

III. COMPENSATION FOR REPUDIATED WIVES: BETWEEN RELIGIOUS AND
LIBERAL-CIVIL FAMILY LAWS

A. The Dilemma
Consider the following situation: Adel, 45, and Fatma, 40, have
been married for 23 years. They have five children. They married in
Pakistan and immigrated to the United States five years ago. They
have been living in conflict for a long time; it began as a feud between
their families and has since become personal. Adel threatened Fatma
several times that he would unilaterally divorce her outside the court,
and one day he acted on his threat. He told her in the presence of
witnesses that he is divorcing her (talaq), and repeated his statement
on two other occasions in the following weeks. Thus, after a short
waiting period, Fatma became a divorced woman in a conservative
community and she has almost no chance of remarrying, given her age
and her status as a divorc6e. Fatma has no profession; she married at
seventeen and never worked outside the home.
Following an inquiry she conducted at a local private Shari'a
court, Fatma learned that Adel could indeed unilaterally divorce her
without filing suit in the Shari'aor civil court, that it was impractical
for her to return to him,5 7 that he could not be coerced to take her back
or to cancel the talaq, and that he could not be forced to appear before
the Shari'a court for a proper hearing of the divorce. Fatma also found
out that she was not entitled to alimony, but at most to the mahr,
which amounted to $5,000. This did not cover even a small part of the
harms she suffered as a result of the talaq. And indeed, in most cases,
58
the sum of the mahr is symbolic.

56.
57.

See Qur'an 4:4-4:24.
See Qur'an 2:230 (explaining divorce procedures under Islamic law).

58.
HUM. RTS. WATCH, UNEQUAL AND UNPROTECTED WOMEN'S RIGHTS UNDER
LEBANESE
PERSONAL
STATUS
LAWS
95-96
(Jan.
2015),

http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/lebanonO115_ForUpload.pdf (last visited
Sept. 28, 2016) [https://perma.cc/8GQJ-2L57] (archived Sept. 9, 2016) ("Under the Sunni
and Shia personal status laws [in Lebanon], when a marriage terminates-even when a
husband decides to unilaterally divorce at will and without cause-the husband is only
required to pay his wife a deferred mahr (the value of which is stipulated in the marriage
contract), and maintenance for the first three-months after the divorce-referred to as
the waiting period, in which the divorce is revocable by the husband. In practice, as
reflected in 38 cases before Sunni and Jafari courts reviewed by Human Rights Watch,
the amount to be paid during the waiting period does not exceed LBP100,000 ($60) per
month. Given this, the spouses' agreement in the marriage contract on the deferred mahr
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Fatma does not know whether the mahr will be recognized in civil
courts in the United States because, under the laws of the state where
they live, she is entitled to receive a much greater sum in the division
of property according to the liberal-secular family law. But she knows
that Adel will insist on paying, at most, the sum of the mahr because
it represents the amount they had agreed in advance that he would pay
in the event of any divorce, even a unilateral one. Fatma returned in
disgrace to her parents' house.
This case involves a minority in a Western country, but poses a
dilemma for the state, which must choose between the preservation of
religious norms and customs that allow for practices such as talaq and
providing relief to a vulnerable spouse at the cost of confrontation with
certain religious practices and members of the minority community.
The issue is whether it is possible to preserve the customs and practices
of minority communities without allowing those practices to develop
into socially harmful situations. If the state decides not to intervene in
such cases, the talaq is acknowledged and only the mahr is paid. But
this means abandoning the weak in the name of multiculturalism, an
extreme and troublesome position with regard to individualism and
women's rights.
The state could intervene through criminal law by deciding to
criminalize religious practices that harm human rights, such as talaq,
even if they are occasionally still permitted and legitimate under
religious family laws. The intervention of criminal law is considered
severe and invasive, however, and states hesitate to resort to it even
where certain religious norms, such as bigamy or polygamy, or even
talaq itself, are violations of state law. 59 Such severe intervention is
reserved for much more serious cases, such as honor killing and
perhaps even female genital mutilation. The state could also decide to
drastically reduce the sovereignty of religious laws and courts in family
matters, decide that talaq is not acknowledged, and distribute the

sum is of great importance. However, women and lawyers interviewed by Human Rights
Watch said that often women entering into marriage disregard the material aspect of
the contract. The deferred mahr amount is in many cases a symbolic figure, for instance
one lira, or one gold coin and does not reflect what spouses' believe would be adequate
compensation in the case of divorce. In interviews with Human Rights Watch, nine
women said that this was because they did not imagine their husbands would
unilaterally divorce them, or that they did not want to put a price on their relationship
with their husbands. Two of them added that they felt social pressure to not request an
appropriate deferred mahr amount. Further, in many cases in which a wife needs to
obtain a certification of divorce from a Sunni or Ja'fari court because her husband has
divorced her outside of a court proceeding (for instance because she wants to remarry)
women give up their financial rights. Human Rights Watch examined 29 judgments from
the Sunni and Jafari courts in which the wife initiated the certification of divorce
proceedings. In 18 of those cases, the wife forfeited her full pecuniary rights in exchange
for certification of termination of the marriage.") (citations omitted).
59. Infra Subsection III.C.3.
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property of Adel and Fatma according to liberal-secular family law,
meaning that she will be awarded much more money than the mahr.
Intervention by criminal law or curtailing the sovereignty of
religious laws and courts are extreme solutions that may harm
multiculturalism and the delicate balance between cultural practices
and the law. A compromise solution that balances individualism with
multiculturalism can be achieved by creating financial disincentives
for the undesirable conduct through private civil law; in other words,
using civil actions to claim damages for the harms created by religious
practices by taxing rather than banning the cultural practice. In this
way both values are upheld: talaq and the mahr are acknowledged, but
the poor financial outcomes of applying the mahr are circumvented.
Thus, in practice, talaq is recognized, but the sting is removed from the
mahr and Fatma can receive compensation for the divorce in a different
form, from a different legal source, which is the harm caused by talaq
itself, in a compensation awarded for a tort claim filed separately
against Adel. Note that tort law improves her financial situation, and
perhaps it is of no concern to her whether she gets the money from the
distribution of property or as tort damages. But the difference is
important because tort compensation, in this case, is only for emotional
distress, that is, non-monetary compensation, and it does not replace
family law remedies. It is a separate path, and compensation for the
non-monetary damages should be additional to the money given under
family law, whether it is only the mahr according to religious values or
the full distribution of property according to liberal values.
But matters are somewhat more complex, as discussed below. In
some countries, similarly to all family law, both talaq and tort law are
part of state law. In other countries only talaq, as part of family law,
represents state law. These are countries where religious law controls
only the personal relations between spouses. In most countries, not
only Western liberal ones but Muslim ones as well, Shari'a is not the
law in any legal domain-civil-secular law is. It is necessary to check
how various countries relate to talaq in the presence of mahr. Given
this situation, Section B of this Part examines the differences between
various countries in the area of family law. Does the law in these
countries choose, in a case such as Adel and Fatma's, to apply the mahr
in a case of talaq, even if this means that Fatma's rights are greatly
infringed upon after the divorce? Or does the law reject the mahr even
if the parties ostensibly agreed to it, and divide the property according
to liberal-secular family law? The first option compromises
individualism and the human rights of the woman; the second option
is consistent with these principles,
but compromises
on
multiculturalism and does not assist in the integration of minorities
and immigrants into the primarily Western society. Tort action for
compensation can change the picture and serve as a soft,
complementary, and intermediary solution.
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B. Compensation by Shari'aFamily Law (Mahr)vs. Division of
PropertyAccording to Liberal-Civil Family Law
1.

Countries governed by Shari'a alone

In countries that are governed exclusively by Shari'a, as several
states in the Persian Gulf are, talaq is permitted and the court can
order the husband to pay damages to his ex-wife from the mahr.60 In
these Islamic countries there is no civil alternative to a religious
agreement with a mahr provision, and therefore this may be the only
compensation possible for a repudiated and, in most cases, relatively
61
poor woman.
2.

Countries governed by Shari'a in personal status only

In countries that are governed by Shari'a in matters of marriage
and divorce only, as in Israel, 62 talaq is also permitted. Therefore, in
these countries, in cases of talaq, as in all cases of divorce, the mahr
applies.
Shari'a courts in Israel are state courts. Although they prefer to
order a divorce following a claim filed with the court and agreed to by
both parties, they must acknowledge that, according to Shari'a, the
husband's act is valid, even if it was carried out outside the court, and
63
even if it was unilateral.
In India the practice of talaq is acknowledged as well, and Muslim
husbands can divorce their wives unilaterally by simply pronouncing
the "talaq" three times. 64 Indian women who have been repudiated are
entitled to claim only the dowry that they brought into the marriage,
65
and they are not entitled to further maintenance.
Lebanon is another country where "denominational jurisdictions
have authority (concerning matters of): marriage contract, its
conditions and marital obligations as well as the validity or non-

60. See,
e.g.,
CONST.
OF
SAUDI
ARABI,
art.
1
http://www.servat.unibe.ch/icl/sa0OOOO0.html [https://perma.cc/SF6C-VBGX] (archived
Sept. 13, 2016) ("The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia is a sovereign Arab Islamic state with
Islam as its religion; God's Book and the Sunnah of His Prophet, God's prayers and peace
be upon him, are its constitution .... ").
61. Falsafi, supra note 55, at 1917.
62. See supra Part I. See also, e.g., Abou Ramadan, supra note 26, at 110 ("With
regard to divorce, which is also within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Shari'a
Courts .... ).
63. I'iad Zahalka, CEO, Israeli Shari'aCourts, Lecture at a Sha'arei Mishpat Law
College Conference on Shari'a and Church Courts, Hod Ha'Sharon, Israel (Sept. 16,
2009) (riad Zahalka is now a judge in the Israeli Shari'acourt).
64.
Nussbaum, supra note 27, at 44.
65. Id.
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validity of the marriage .... ,,66 In Lebanon, divorce laws among both
Shia and Sunni Muslims are personal status laws, according to which
only the husband has the absolute, inalienable right to terminate a
67
marriage unilaterally, without cause, and outside a court of law.
Under Druze law, however, although husbands also have an absolute
right to unilaterally terminate a marriage at will and without cause,
they must do so in court. 68 If the court finds that a Druze husband used
talaq without legitimate cause, it can award damages to the wife,
taking into consideration both material and moral harm.6 9 Thus, for
Shia and Sunni Muslims in Lebanon, the situation is similar to that in
India, whereas, for the Druze, compensation may be offered under

66. Article 2 of the April 3, 1951 Lebanese Law on Personal Status. See GIHANE
TABET, WOMEN IN PERSONAL STATUS LAWS: IRAQ, JORDAN, LEBANON,
PALESTINE, SYRIA, 1, 3 (2005), http://www.unesco.org/new/fileadmin/MULTIMEDIA/H
Q/SHS/pdf/Women in Personal StatusLaws.pdf (last visited Sept. 28, 2016)
[https:f/perma.cc/44EV-4ZHA] (archived Sept. 13, 2016).
67. BASHIR AL-BILANI, PERSONAL STATUS LAWS IN LEBANON 123-24 (1982)
(Arabic), mentioned in HUM. RTS. WATCH, supra note 58, at 52. See also AL-BILANI,
supra note 67, at II, 3, 41-42 ("Marriage is a contract under Shia, Sunni, and Druze
personal status laws in Lebanon and it can be terminated by divorce. Rules regulating
the termination of marriage, particularly in the Sunni and Shia confessions,
discriminate against women by limiting their ability to end their marriages. Men, on the
other hand, have a unilateral, unlimited right to pronounce a divorce, with or without
cause, and outside of any judicial proceeding. [Fn 65: While a man under Sunni and Shia
personal status laws can divorce without the intervention of any religious or judicial
authorities he does so without the religious court's certification. Absent this certification
there is no binding court decision that obliges the man to pay the deferred mahr and the
three months maintenance during the waiting period ... I.").
68. Id. ("Under Druze law, men also have an absolute right to unilaterally
terminate a divorce at will and without cause but must do so in a court. Druze women
can also be compensated if a judge finds that her husband is divorcing her absent a
legitimate reason. Additionally, Druze men and women can terminate their marriage
before a Druze court if the spouses mutually consent to a divorce. Severance is also
grounds for divorce for Druze women. Shia personal status law does not recognize
severance, making Shia women's access to divorce without the power to divorce written
into her marriage contract even more limited than that of Druze and Sunni women. In
these cases, Shia women seeking divorce can only seek relief from a Jafari religious
authority, outside the court, which can divorce her on behalf of her husband-a practice
known as 'sovereign divorce.' The process is lengthy, and two lawyers who spoke to
Human Rights Watch said that it may take up to two years to receive the order, with no
guarantee that a religious court will then verify it and the woman will obtain a
divorce .... Additionally, Druze men and women can terminate their marriage before a
Druze court if the spouses mutually consent to a divorce. Under Shia and Sunni personal
status laws a husband can revoke a divorce within the waiting period... without his
wife's consent and without the need to conclude a new marriage. After this period or if
the husband has pronounced it three times divorce becomes irrevocable and the marital
bond is severed ... Druze women also have circumscribed access to divorce and may risk
losing their pecuniary rights while Druze men can obtain a divorce, with or without
cause, by petitioning a Druze judge and receiving a divorce judgment."). The Druze are
an Arabic-speaking esoteric ethnoreligious group, originating in Western Asia, and live
in Israel mostly in the north of the country.
69.
Druze Personal Status Law, art. 49, mentioned in HUM. RTS. WATCH, supra
note 58, at 3, 41-42, 96.
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family law. The compensation awarded by family courts in Lebanon is
relatively high: it ranges from LBP (Lebanese pound) 5 million to LBP
7
50 million (approximately $3,300-$33,300). 0
3.

Countries governed by secular law and not Shari'a

In countries that are not governed by Shari'a, but honor religious
practices (some Muslim and some Western countries), there are
different solutions to the dilemma within state family law. Some of
these solutions allow limited damages, for example, out of the mahr,
and some do not acknowledge the mahr and allow women to file a plea
for the division of property according to liberal family law values.
In some of these countries (e.g., Tunisia 7' and Iraq7 2), divorce
without the other spouse's consent is permitted, but a judicial
recognition of the repudiation is required. 73 The court can order the
husband to pay damages to his ex-wife from the mahr.74
In some countries that are not governed by Shari'a(e.g., Jordan 75
and Syria 76 ), the legislature has introduced an article in personal
status laws to compensate women for the husband's abuse of his
unilateral right to divorce: talaq ta'asufi.77 Some scholars opposed this

70. HUM. RTS. WATCH, supranote 58, at 96.
71. Adrien Katherine Wing, Custom, Religion, and Rights: The Future Legal
Status of PalestinianWomen, 35 HARV. INT'L L.J. 149 (1994).
72. Stigall, supra note 28, at 53 (explaining that although talaq is acknowledged
in Iraq, under Iraqi law judicial recognition of the repudiation is still required. Under
art. 39(1) of the Iraqi Law of Personal Status, 1959, "He who desires to repudiate
his ... wife must commence proceedings in the Shari'a court to demand that this be
effected, and must seek a judgment accordingly. If he cannot reach a court at that time,
he must register the divorce during the 'idda' period.").
73. Nathan B. Oman, How to Judge Sharia Contracts: A Guide to Islamic
MarriageAgreements in American Courts, 2011 UTAH L. REV. 287 (2011).
74.
See generally SHAHAM, supra note 40, at 27-41 (noting, among others, that
there is a difference between the sum received at the time of the marriage (prompt
dower) and the sum due to the wife upon divorce (deferred dower). If the husband
divorces his wife before the consummation of the marriage, the wife is only due half her
dowry. Regarding Algeria, see for example Family Law of 1984 (De la dissolution du
marriage), Title II, art. 52 [Alg.] ("If the judge considers that the husband has abused
his right to talaq, he awards to the wife the right to damages and interest for the harm
she has suffered.")).
75. Abou Ramadan, supra note 26, at 111 (referring to art. 134 of the Jordanian
Law of Personal Status of 1976 ("If the husband repudiates his wife in an arbitrary
manner, e.g. without a reasonable cause, and she applies to the judge for compensation,
the judge shall order for her against her ex-husband the compensation deemed by the
judge to be fair, provided that it shall not be in excess of the equivalent of the
maintenance due to her for a year.").
76. Id. (referring to art. 117 of the Syrian Law of Personal Status of 1953 (amended
1975); NASIR, supra note 25, at 135-36).
77. Abou Ramadan, supra note 26, at 111-12 n.105 ("The article is based on the
idea of abuse of rights. The man has unilateral right to divorce, but he should not abuse
this right. When one exercises his rights he cannot be responsible for harm caused to
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mechanism of compensation.78 In Israel, the Shari'a Court of Appeals
79
has refused to follow this practice.
In some U.S. states, talaq that was performed in other countries
is acknowledged because of the contractual nature of marriage and
divorce in the country of origin.80 In these cases, the mahr is viewed as
a type of prenuptial agreement 8 l and compensation for talaq (or for
divorce in general) is calculated only according to the mahr, not
according to liberal values of division of property. The reason is that, if
the mahr is a prenuptial agreement, it means that the parties agreed
that, in case of divorce, the settlement specified in the mahr overrides
any other matrimonial settlements. A similar situation exists in
Germany.82
The issue remains controversial. Scholars have pointed out the
differences between mahr and prenuptial agreements.8 3 One of the
main differences between the two is that Islamic marriage does not

another ('nemimen laedit qui suojure utitur'). But the theory of abuse of rights relativizes
one's exercise of one's rights and limits these rights, particularly when the rights are
used to harm a third party. This concept was developed by the French civil doctrine; see
FRANCOIS TERRE, PHILIPPE SIMLER YVES LEQUETTE, DROIT CIVIL LES OBLIGATIONS
661-66 (1993). Some scholars tried to anchor this theory in Islamic law. See MAHHMOUD
FATHY, LA NOTION DE L'ABUS DES DROITs DANS LA JURISPRUDENCE MUSULMANE

(1912).").
78. Abou Ramadan, supra note 26, at 111 n.104 (referring to MUHAMMAD ABU
ZAHRA, AL-AHWAL AL-SHAKHSIYYA 285-86 (1957)).
79. Id. at 112 (referring to A 259/2003 of 1/27/2004, and explaining that "[t]he
Shari'a Court of Appeals in Israel refused to follow this line of thinking for two reasons.
The first was that this rule of talaq ta'asufi has no accepted shari'abasis. The second is
that [as mentioned above] a Muslim woman can sue her husband in civil court and the
man could be prosecuted by the state").
80. Falsafi, supra note 55, at 1890.
81.
See, e.g., Zawahiri v. Alwattar, 2008-Ohio- 3473U, 2008 WL 2698679, at *5 (Ct.
App. July 10, 2008).
82.
German law does not specifically regulate Islamic marriage and divorce, but
the law of a foreign country may be applied, e.g., when a wife claims her mahr. In 2009,
the Bundesgerichtshof ruled that the mahr qualifies as effects of marriage. In a case in
2009, a wife claimed her mahr payment (Morgengabe) as agreed in her marriage, which
was contracted in Iran. The couple was married in Iran in 1992 and divorced in Germany
in 2006, according to German law. The wife requested the money owed to her under
Iranian law, including an increase in accordance with the inflation of Iranian currency.
The husband wanted the divorce to take place completely in accordance with German
law and claimed that if Iranian law applied, the mahr or another sum, which both parties
agree upon, should be returned to him whenever the wife initiates divorce proceedings.
See BGH Dec. 9, 2009, XII ZR 107/08, http://juris.bundesgerichtshof de/cgi-bin/rechtspr
echung/document.py?Gericht=bgh&Art=en&sid=7caa3ba880fdl7 1dbccee324c6c2287&
nr=51052&pos=24&anz=26 [https://perma.cc/VCL3-YLRU] (archived Sept. 28, 2016)
(Ger.).
83.
See Falsafi, supra note 55, at 1916-18 (outlining the similarities and
differences between mahr and prenuptial agreements, and adding that "[hiampered by
their limited understanding of the nature of the mahr, and based on the definition of a
premarital agreement in the Uniform Premarital Agreement Act as a contract 'made in
contemplation of marriage and to be effective upon marriage,' many courts reflexively
analogize the mahr to a premarital agreement") (citations omitted).
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mirror the Western narrative, which mistakenly views marriage either
as a sacrament or as a simple civil union, while the mahr is considered
simply a gift or prize to the bride in exchange for her agreement to
marry, and it is not a vehicle for apportioning property and resources
at the time of divorce. 8 4 Therefore, "since the mahr is not designed to
address the division of the marital estate, she [the woman] is often left
at the time of divorce only with the gift she received for entering into
85
the marriage."
Another difference is that the mahr, as the Islamic marriage
contract, provides fewer rights to the woman to obtain a divorce under
Islamic law. One way for a Muslim wife to grant a divorce is al khala,
which is an offer by the wife to renounce her mahr.86 Furthermore, the
mahr is not a voluntary contract like a prenuptial agreement, but a
mandatory part of an Islamic marriage contract, and Muslim parties
cannot marry without a mahr provision8 7 Because the mahr is simply

84. Id. at 1916-17 (explaining that "any financial agreement negotiated between
a couple in the West as part of their marital arrangement entails an extra, voluntary
step and, as such, is assumed to center around the bargaining away of certain rights.
Thus, legal protections (crafted around pre-marital statutes and under the common law)
mandate specific acts, such as the disclosure of the parties* assets or the requirement
that an attorney be present at the time the agreement is executed. By contrast, an
Islamic marriage is centered on a simple contract, which embodies certain mandatory
terms as a pre-requisite for matrimony and is null and void without the necessary
bargaining over the mahr provision. Muslims, who are quite familiar with the customary
haggling over the mahr, are not under the slightest misconception that the negotiation
represents in any remote way an extraordinary or unanticipated bargaining away of
their rights ...[a]ny expectation over assets a Muslim husband or wife may have do not
stem from the marriage contract, but rather from Islamic property law.") (citations
omitted). See also Nathan B. Oman, Bargainingin the Shadow of God's Law: Islamic
Mahr Contracts and the Perils of Legal Specialization, 45 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 579,
600 (2010); BHALA, supra note 55, at § 35.02 [A]. Falsafi further explains the potentially
problematic consequences of the groundless comparison: "[A] potentially even more
damaging fate may befall the wife if the court mischaracterizes the mahr as a prenuptial
agreement and then upholds it as the parties' sole agreement for the comprehensive
division of all their marital property, often placing the wife in a dramatically weaker
position than if the allocation of assets was adjudicated under a civil regime. While many
state prenuptial statutes contain default rules giving the wife rights in property titled
in the husband's name if a civil prenuptial agreement is silent on marital property,
Islamic law does not give the wife any rights in property titled in her husband's
name .... Falsafi, supra note 55, at 1919 (citing Aleem, 947 A.2d at 491). At the same
time, Falsafi notes that "[s]ome lower court decisions indicate that, in an effort to reach
a just outcome, courts are willing to treat factually similar cases very differently and
strike down a mahr provision on public policy grounds if drawing the parallel with a
prenuptial agreement will deprive the wife of any meaningful amount of community
property, but uphold the validity of the mahr as a premarital agreement in the absence
of a significant marital estate, so that the wife may derive some financial benefit from
the union." Id. referring to In re Marriage of Shaban, 105 Cal. Rptr. 2d 863, 865, 870
(Cal. Ct. App. 2001)).
85.
Falsafi, supra note 55, at 1919 (citing Aleem 947 A.2d at 491).
86. Id. at 1918 (referring also to BHALA, supra note 55, at § 35.01-35.02[A]).
87. Id. at 1917.
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a gift for entering the marriage, it is payable at any time during the
life of the marriage, even if the spouses never divorce; this is different
from a prenuptial agreement, which mostly anticipates the division of
resources and assets in the event of a divorce, and therefore the mahr
lacks the procedural safeguards that exist in most prenuptial statutes,
88
including sanctions against the party who breaches it.
Naturally, a Muslim couple married in the United States in a civil
marriage need not sign a mahr, as they would in Muslim countries in
which Shari'a is not dominant.8 9 But many Muslim immigrants who
were married before coming to the United States may not have had the
option of a civil marriage and may not have been able to avoid the mahr
provision. Should American civil courts, therefore, have the authority
to recognize mahr in these cases and order husbands to pay mahr to
their repudiated wives in general, especially in cases where it
contradicts some spousal rights? 90
Muslim husbands claim that U.S. courts must recognize the
foreign divorce, and that women's claims for any marital property must
be limited to what would be available to them in their country of
origin, 91 that is, mahr, and not division of property according to
Western laws. Although the U.S. Constitution requires that states give
the judgments of sister states full faith and credit, 92 U.S. recognition
of foreign acts is a matter of comity. 93 U.S. courts have uniformly
refused to recognize talaq, considering it to be a violation of state and
federal constitutional provisions of equal protection and due process,
despite the presence of an ex ante marriage contract conforming to the
94
requirements of Islamic law.
Husbands also argue that their wives have no claim on marital
property beyond the sum specified as the mahr, and in at least one case

88. Id.
89. Id. at 1917-18 (explaining, however, that the couple is "often under enormous
pressure to solemnize their bond in accordance with religious procedure - otherwise their
union would be deemed illegitimate with grave social implications .... By contrast, no
one in the United States is obligated to enter into a prenuptial agreement and in the
process potentially forgo the benefits of civil family law protections.").
90. Id. at 1920-21 ("The strategy of evaluating mahr provisions as premarital
agreements becomes even riskier in disputes where the marriage took place abroad. In
these decisions, courts face greater pressure to either enforce mahr provisions as
premarital agreements (as part of a foreign divorce order), to the great financial
detriment of women, or to strike down the foreign divorce orders and confront charges of
defective comity analysis."). See also Rajni K. Sekhri, Note, Aleem v. Aleem: A Divorce
from the ProperComity Standard-Lowering the Bar That Courts Must Reach to Deny
Recognizing Foreign Judgments, 68 MD. L. REV. 662, 689-90 (2009) (criticizing the
"defective comity analysis" in court ruling).
91.
Falsafi, supra note 55, at 1921 (discussing Chaudry v. Chaudry, 388 A.2d 1000,
1006 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1978)).
92.
U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1.
93.
Falsafi, supranote 55, at 1921.
94. Id. at 1920, 1922.
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this argument was successful: the New Jersey appellate division
reversed the trial court and applied Pakistani law-which, for the
major tenets of family law, is based on Shari'a-refusing to divide the
property according to New Jersey law, despite the fact that the couple
had spent several years in the United States. 95 In other cases, courts
were willing to order the division of the property in cases of talaq,
awarding more than the- mahr, and stating that embracing the talaq
would be contrary to public policy. 96 Other countries have also stated
that talaq is contrary to public policy, including England 97 and
Canada.98

95.
Chaudry, 388 A.2d at 1004 (explaining that according to Pakistani law, the
wife was not entitled to alimony or support upon a divorce). The court held that the
husband's ongoing domicile in New Jersey constituted an insufficient nexus to New
Jersey for the courts to award the wife equitable division of property. Id. at 1006. In this
case, the couple married in Pakistan in an Islamic ceremony, then moved to the United
States. A few years later the wife moved back to Pakistan with her children, thinking
that her husband would permanently join her. But after a few years the husband
informed the wife by mail that he had filed divorce papers with the Pakistani consulate
in New York City. Although the divorce-talaq-wasconfirmed by Pakistani courts, the
wife instituted a separate maintenance action in New Jersey. The court concluded that
the wife "is not entitled to equitable distribution by reason of the [antinuptial]
agreement" and limited her to a payment of $ 1,500. Id.
96. See, e.g., Maklad v. Maklad, FA000443796S, 2001 WL 51662 (Conn. Super. Ct.
Jan. 3, 2001) (declining to recognize the validity of unilateral divorce, where the husband
had divorced the wife according to religious custom, then had sought a decree in Egypt
merely to grant civil recognition to the religious divorce); Aleem, 947 A.2d at 491. In
Aleem, A couple had married in Pakistan but lived and worked in the U.S. for twenty
years. There was a dispute as to the division of the husband's pension. After the wife
iAitiated divorce proceedings, the husband obtained a talaq at the Pakistani embassy in
Washington, D.C. The court compared the Pakistani marriage contract to a premarital
agreement, but rejected the husband's claim that payment of the mahr, in the amount
of $2,500, was all that was "due the wife, as opposed to the one half of almost two million
dollars that she might be entitled to under Maryland law." Id. at 493 n.5, 494. The court
explained that the Pakistani marriage contract could not be equated with a valid
premarital agreement because Pakistani Muslim-family law and Maryland law differed
on how property is divided if there is no agreement: the former would not award the wife
property that is not in her name whereas the latter would. Id. at 491. The court struck
down the mahr arrangement on technical grounds, referred to the comity issue, and
refused to recognize Pakistan talaq laws, because such a unilateral step is contrary to
Maryland public policy. See also Falsafi, supra note 55, at 1923-27 (discussing this case
as well as two additional judgments with factual parallels and different outcomes: In
Zawahiri v. Alwattar, 2008-Ohio-3473, 2008 WL 2698679 at *4 (Ohio Ct. App. 2008) the
court made the analogy between the mahr and a premarital agreement, whereas in
Odatalla v. Odatalla, 810 A.2d 93, 98 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 2002), the court saw the
mahr as a pure and simple contract).
97.
See, e.g., Sulaiman v. Juffali, [2002] 2 FCR 427 (Fam.) (U.K.) (the court refused
to recognize the validity of a triple talaq performed in England, despite the fact that it
was valid in Saudi Arabia, where the parties were domiciled, because there were other
proceedings for divorce in England).
98. Divorce Act, R.S.S 1985, c D-3.4 (Can.) ("A divorce granted ... pursuant to a
law of a country or subdivision of a country other than Canada by a tribunal or other
authority having jurisdiction to do so shall be recognized for all purposes of determining
the marital status in Canada of any person, if either former spouse was ordinarily
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To sum up, some U.S. courts have recognized mahr provisions as
a type of prenuptial agreement, 99 and others have refused to enforce
mahr agreements, regarding them as premarital contracts bargaining
away a wife's claim to marital property. 100 One of the problems in this
regard is that under the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment
to the Constitution, there is a question as to whether the resolution of
a religious dispute in civil court interferes with the defendant's
constitutional right to freely exercise his religion, given the fact that
"Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion,"
and the Free Exercise Clause forbids the passage of laws which
"prohibit[] the free exercise thereof.'u0 1

resident in that country or subdivision for at least one year immediately preceding the
commencement of proceedings for divorce."). See Bhatti v. Canada (Minister of
Citizenship & Immigration), 2003 CarswellNat 4866 (2003) (Can.) (WL) (recognizing the
validity of a talaq divorce obtained out of the country, but suggesting that the divorce
would not necessarily have been valid if enacted in Canada); Siddiqi v. Canada, 2001
CarswellNat 4374 (Imm. & Refugee Board, App. Div. 2001) (Can.) (WL) (declining to
recognize a talaq divorce obtained largely to circumvent civil proceedings in Canada).
99. Falsafi, supra note 55, at 1920 (referring to Akileh v. Elchahal, 666 So. 2d 246,
248 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996), and explaining that "in Akileh v. Elchahal, where the
marital estate was insignificant, but the parties had stipulated to a $50,000 mahr
provision, the court, confronted with perhaps an even vaguer marriage contract than the
one in Shaban, readily ruled that the mahr constituted an enforceable prenuptial
agreement, entitling the wife to the $50,000 she demanded under the terms of the
document. The court's sympathies were particularly aroused in this case because the
wife sought divorce after she contracted genital warts from her husband a year after the
marriage, which condition he had failed to disclose prior to their union. Similarly, in
Afghahi v.Ghafoorian [Afghahi v. Ghafoorian, No. 1481-09-4, 2010 WL 1189383, at 1
n.1, 4 (Va. Ct. App. Mar. 30, 2010)], where the couple had no other assets, the court held
that the marriage contract constituted a premarital agreement and enforced payment
under the mahr provision.") (citations omitted).
100. Falsafi, supra note 55, at 1918, 1918 n.199 ("Ignoring these glaring distinctions
between a mahr and a prenuptial agreement can lead to some unwelcome results in the
lower courts. The most obvious risk of analogizing the mahr to a premarital agreement
is that it could easily be struck down on technical grounds because it is negotiated simply
according to community customs without attention to common law and statutory
standards that must be met when executing a legally binding prenuptial agreement.
Consequently, when a mahr agreement is struck down because it was not entered into
in a timely manner or because the parties failed to consult a lawyer or properly disclose
their assets, the wife is deprived of the benefit of her contractual bargain, even though
none of these steps were a pre-requisite at the time she executed the mahr. See, e.g.,
Ahmed v. Ahmed, 261 S.W.3d 190, 194 (Tex. App. 2008). In Ahmed, the parties entered
into their civil marriage six months prior to executing an Islamic marriage contract,
which stipulated that the husband pay a deferred mahr of $ 50,000 to the wife. Id. at
192-93. The Texas Court of Appeals evaluated the mahr provision as a premarital
agreement and held that it was invalid because it was entered into after the civil
ceremony, rather than made in contemplation of marriage. Id. at 194. Yet Muslims living
in non-Muslim jurisdictions very frequently enter into both civil and religious
arrangements with no particular attention to the order of these events. Since under
Islamic law, the mahr constitutes an agreement by the husband to give a gift to the
prospective bride, the timing of the civil ceremony should be irrelevant.").
101. Falsafi, supra note 55, at 1883-84 (explaining that "[m]any of the lower courts'
decisions focus on the third prong of the Lemon [v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13
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There are different approaches to the question of whether civilsecular courts can and should interfere in religious disputes and rule
in matters like mahr following talaq, or whether this infringes on the
First Amendment. 102 Scholars have argued that many U.S. courts
unnecessarily choose to abstain from hearing any kind of religious
dispute,10 3 and that maybe it is time to restore the Supreme Court's
distinction between religious beliefs, which are protected by the First
Amendment to a great extent, and religious acts (such as talaq or
refusal to divorce in the Jewish community), which are less protected
by the First Amendment and where more room for judicial intervention
exists.104

(1971)] test and struggle with how they may resolve a religious dispute without
,entanglement in questions of religious doctrine.' The Supreme Court offers two
options
for overcoming this dilemma. First, under the deference approach, courts, when
reviewing internal church disputes, may defer to the holdings of the highest authority
within the religious institution where the disagreement arose. Second, pursuant to the
neutral-principles approach, civil courts may resolve religious disputes using secular
legal rules circumventing the need to rely on theological standards. While the Supreme
Court may have intended that the two standards operate harmoniously, [the article]
examines whether the deference and neutral-principles approaches give rise to
conflicting guidelines and cause considerable confusion and inconsistency in the lower
courts.") (citation omitted).
102. Falsafi, supra note 55,passim (presenting several approaches being followed,
such as the deference and the neutral-principles approaches, together with what is
referred to as a desirable approach. See, e.g., id. at 1890-91).
103. Id. at 1884 (adding that "some scholars view the slightest cleavage in what
they refer to as the Court's church autonomy doctrine with alarm.").
104. Id. at 1898 (adding that "Smith does not change the law regarding government
action that impedes religious belief as opposed to religious acts. The majority confirmed
that, most importantly, 'the free exercise of religion means ... the right to believe and
profess whatever religious doctrine one desires,' but that the same blanket protection
does not extend to religious conduct. [Emp't Div., Dep't of Human Res. of Or. v.] Smith,
494 U.S. 872, 877 (1990). In other words, Smith, where applicable, restores the
distinction made in earlier Supreme Court decisions preceding Sherbert (such as
Reynolds) pursuant to which the First Amendment gives far greater protection to
religious belief than to religious conduct. Third, the Smith decision leaves in place higher
levels of protection for hybrid rights involving 'the Free Exercise Clause in conjunction
with other constitutional protections, such as freedom of speech . . . or the rights of
parents.' Smith, 494 U.S. at 881.") (citations omitted).
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Summary

Table 1: Decision chart regarding whether the mahr is recognized as
part of religious family law (Shari'a), or whether the property is
divided according to liberal-secular family law.
Is Shari'a the state law?
Shari'a is state law in all
areas of law (Saudi Arabia
and several Persian Gulf
countries)
Shari'a is state law only in
the area of personal status of
Muslim
couples
(Israel,
Lebanon, and India)
Shari'a is not state law
(Western
countries,
and
Muslim countries such as
Tunisia, Iraq, Jordan, and
Syria)

Is mahr or property division
applied?
Mahr

Mahr

In some of these countries the mahr
is recognized and considered a type of
prenuptial
agreement,
although
some believe that the two differ in
their essence; in other countries it is
not recognized because it conflicts
with public policy or for some other
reason, such as conflict with the First
Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.

Thus, in countries where the result of talaq is only mahr, and
especially if the amount is small or symbolic, women are harmed and
justice is not served. Arguments that this is a contractual agreement
that should not be interfered with ignore the background of mahr. The
problem is twofold: no equitable division of the property is carried out,
and the woman is not entitled to compensation for the harm caused by
talaq, unlike the case of a woman who is divorced in a Shari'a court,
where a judicial ruling is issued. Even in countries where the result of
talaq is rejection of mahr, and the property is divided according to the
liberal-civil family law, the woman is still not compensated for the
harms of the unilateral divorce, and justice is served, at most, in the
area of the division of property.
IV. TORT LAW AS A DESIRABLE AND COMPLEMENTARY BUT
INDEPENDENT SOFT SOLUTION

This Part introduces an important, potentially decisive way of
solving the problems presented above: civil tort claims for harm caused
to the women by unilateral divorce. It examines whether such an action
for compensation is possible in various types of countries (as far as
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dominance of Shari'ais concerned), and describes the situation in one
country where claims of this type have been accepted for more than
three decades. Next, from a normative point of view, this Part proposes
recognizing such tort actions in some of these types of countries and
explains their importance, not only for the specific cases of talaq in
combination with mahr, but also in general, in the matter of an
effective (and indirect) struggle against harmful religious practices.
A. The Situation
Extending the example above, although talaq is a legitimate
practice under religious family law, it seriously harms Fatma's rights
and breaches her autonomy. Fatma cannot return to her married life.
She decides to resort to tort law to change the oppressive result of
religious family law. She brings a civil action for a practice that is
legitimate under religious family laws, arguing that the practice harms
her, as the vulnerable spouse. She asks the court to award her damages
for the emotional non-monetary and economic monetary harm caused
by being unilaterally repudiated, including shame and the loss of
chances to remarry in the highly conservative society where she
lives. 105
Fatma knows that even if she obtains a large financial
compensation, this does not change her status and she will not revert
to being married. But the compensation can help her get on her feet.
From her point of view, this is a separate process from any possible
action in family law, where she will receive a mahr in the sum of
$5,000, or succeed in forcing a division of property according to
Western family law. The tort action provides compensation for the
severe harm she suffered as a result of the unilateral divorce per se;
family law does not provide such compensation.
In filing the claim Fatma also knows that a civil judgment for
ordering damages of this type may deter other husbands from taking
such action. She is thinking mainly of Salma, her friend, who is in a
similar situation, because her husband, Mustafa, is threatening to
divorce her unilaterally and marry a younger woman. Can a tort action
of this sort be filed in every country? And what is the relation between
the tort action and mahr on one hand, and the tort action and the
division of property according to secular family law on the other? These
questions are answered below.

105. See, e.g., CA 11035/07 Clalit Health Services v. Avitan, Pador 2011(76) PD 137
(2011) (Isr.), § 5 (acknowledging non-pecuniary damage of lost chance of inability to
remarry in torts); File No. 24760/08 FamF (Jer.) Sh. B. R. v. R. R. (Mar. 25, 2010), Nevo
Legal Database (by subscription, in Hebrew) (Isr.) (recognizing the loss of chance to
remarry as a non-pecuniary harm in a case in which the defendant did not disclose to his
ex-wife, the plaintiff, his impotence, and after the divorce her chances of remarrying as
a divorced woman have diminished).
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B. The Possible Use of Tort Law
1.

Countries governed by Shari'a alone

In countries that are governed strictly by Shari'a,and where talaq
is permitted, talaq is unlikely to be considered a tort. Tort action for
talaq would therefore be impossible in these countries.
2.

Countries governed by Shari'ain personal status only

A tort action for talaq is relevant in Israel because of the special
situation in this country where only marriage and divorce are
adjudicated according to the religious family law. 10 6 Theoretically, the
same is true with regard to India and Lebanon. Talaq is permitted
according to Israeli family law, but it is nevertheless considered a tort
and an offense. Although there is no corresponding tort of talaq, the
action is possible by means of general torts.
There are two ways of bringing a tort action for damages from
talaq in Israel. Indeed, the recognized tort actions are based on a mix
of tort and criminal laws. Article 181 of the Penalty Law of 1977107
holds that a husband who repudiates his wife without her consent and
without the intervention of an authorized court is subject to five years
of imprisonment. 108 Israeli tort legislation acknowledges a tort of
breach of statutory duty, which is a legislated obligation, in a way that
resembles the American tort of negligence per se. 10 9 In certain cases,
Israeli law allows damaged parties to bring a tort action based on
infringement of criminal sections using the general tort of breach of
statutory duty, described in section 63 of the Tort Ordinance.1 10 Civil
actions for talaq based on these grounds have been acknowledged by
the Israeli Supreme Court.1 ' The other alternative is to use the tort of
negligence.1 1 2 Note that in Israel there is no clear distinction between

106. See, e.g., Blecher-Prigat & Shmueli, supranote 6, at 280.
107. Israeli Penal Law, 5737-1977, SH No. 864, art. 181 (Isr.).
108. Abou Ramadan, supra note 26, at 111 ("Though the wording of the clause is
general and theoretically applies to all the different religious communities in Israel, in
practice it is intended for Muslims, since classical Muslim law acknowledges unilateral
divorce. The High Court of Justice interpreted the term 'in spite of the woman' to mean
that the divorce is made against her will ... [D]ivorce of the wife by coercion and without
a court judgment is considered a criminal offense.") (citing TP 775/79 State of Israel v.
Diab Issawi, PM 1980(2) 381 (1980) (Isr.)).
109. See, e.g., Martin v. Herzog, 126 N.E. 814, 815 (N.Y. 1920) (discussing
negligence per se); GEORGE C. CHRISTIE ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON THE LAW OF
TORTS 158-79 (4th ed. 2004) (discussing negligence per se).
110. Civil Wrongs Ordinance § 63, 5728-1968, 2 LST 12 (1968) (Isr.).
111. See, e.g., CA 245/81 Sultan v. Sultan PD 38(3) 169 (1984) (Isr.); CA 1730/92
Masarwa v. Masarwa Dinim Elyon 38, 369 (1995) (Isr.). See also Abou Ramadan, supra
note 26, at 111-12.
112. Civil Wrongs Ordinance, §§35-36, 5732-1972, 2 LSI 12 (1972) (Isr.).
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intentional and unintentional torts, and therefore the tort of
negligence is also relevant in intentional acts.113
The harms may be both monetary and non-monetary (nonpecuniary). The divorced woman often finds herself with no source of
sustenance, because in some countries alimony is not granted after
divorce (this is the situation in the case of classic Muslim law11 4), only
child support.'1 5 In conservative societies it may also be difficult for
her to remarry." 6 Therefore, she can apply for mostly non-monetary
damages such as shame and suffering and emotional distress for being
7
divorced against her will.
Tort law provides the harmed woman with a secondary remedy of
damages," 8 but cannot grant the primary remedy of status: damages
cannot make her married again. Even if her husband wishes to
remarry her, perhaps in exchange for renouncing the claim and
cancelling the damages, this is not practical because Shari'a requires
that she first marry another man and that he then divorce her before
she can remarry her first husband." 9
However, in filing a tort claim the woman has the burden of
proving the husband's fault (in this case, breach of statutory obligation
or violation of the duty of care in the case of the tort of negligence). By
contrast, in the case of compensation based on an agreement such as
mahr, there is no need to prove fault. (Note that Western family law
also seeks to avoid the question of fault-based liability and prefers to
grant a no-fault divorce.) Thus, the burden in a tort action is greater
than in an action based on family law, at least as far as having to prove
fault is concerned. This means that if the mahr is sufficiently large, or
if it is not recognized and the property is divided according to Western

113. See, e.g., CA 2034/98 Amin v. Amin 53(5) IsrSC 69 (1999) (Isr.) (translation
available at http://elyon1.court.gov.il/files-eng/98/340/020/qO7/98020340.qO7.htm
[https://perma.cc/W3MF-DL5N] (archived Sept. 28, 2016)) (Section 13 to Justice
Englard s judgment).
114. See Qur'an 4:4-4:24.
115. Regarding Israel, see for example, The Family Amendment (Maintenance) Law
1959, SH No. 726 §§ 2, 3, 3A (Isr.); MOSHE CHIGIER, HUSBAND AND WIFE IN ISRAELI LAW
99-104, 191-93 (1985) ("[T]hough the divorcee does not get maintenance formally, she
gets it informally in the form of payment for her services to the children .... ); TALIA
EINHORN, PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW IN ISRAEL 50 (2009).

116. Cf. FamF (Nz) 9371-08/09 N.S. v. M.H.S. (not published, 23.3.2012) (Isr.)
(arguing that the social stigma surrounding divorce causes women severe emotional
distress); File No. 49212-02/12 FamA (Nz) Doe v. Roe (7.16.2002), § 2, Nevo Legal
Database (by subscription, in Hebrew) (Isr.) (acknowledging that divorce causes shame,
sorrow, and suffering, affecting the prospects of remarriage). See also Falsafi, supra note
55, at 1910.
117. See, e.g., Sultan v. Sultan, supra note 111 (ruling in favor of a woman receiving
damages for being divorced against her will); CA (TA) 1059/94 Jaber v. Jaber, PM 1994(1)
458 (1994) (Isr.) (ruling in favor of a woman receiving damages for being divorced against
her will).
118. See supra note 108 and accompanying text.
119. See Qur'an 2:230 (explaining divorce procedures under Islamic law).
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family law to the satisfaction of the woman, it may not be worthwhile
for her to take tort action against her husband and have to prove the
harm caused by talaq, especially if the tort compensation is not
expected to be high. The choice, however, must be the woman's, and
the tort mechanism should be available to her.
It appears that a tort action would also be relevant in India, even
though a solution seems to exist there in compensation based on
criminal law. Section 125 of the Indian Uniform Criminal Procedure
Code forbids a man "of adequate means" to permit various close
relatives, including an ex-wife, to remain in a state of "destitution and
vagrancy." 120 Martha Nussbaum explains that many women divorced
under Muslim law in India have been able to win grants of
maintenance under this Criminal Code Section, and that recognition
of ex-wives as relations under this section was introduced explicitly for
the purpose of compensating repudiated women. 121 But this section
seems unable to solve all the cases of compensation needed for
repudiated women, and there is a need for a tort action, such as the
one acknowledged in principle in Israeli law.
Regarding tort actions for talaq in Israel, Abou Ramadan criticizes
the "integration between the criminal order and the interpretations of
the High Court of Justice regarding the tortious aspects of divorce [in
that they] have emptied the institution of divorce of its content." 122 One
can assume that Abou Ramadan would criticize the Indian law as well,
on the same grounds; however, the issue should be considered
differently. Implementing the tort solution may separate the right to
divorce into the two dimensions: status in religious family law and
damages in torts (in the Israeli case) or under criminal law (in the
Indian case). In this way, the laws do not collide, and the tort
mechanism provides a solution that, although not optimal from the
point of view of human rights, offers the best option available. This
solution does not abolish the institution of talaq, which remains a valid
practice according to the law of these countries, but it carries a price
tag.

120. Nussbaum, supra note 27, at 44 (explaining that this was an addition to the
Section that was amended in 1973). Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, No. 2, Acts of
Parliament 1973, (India) https://www.oecd.orglsite/adboecdanti-corruptioninitiative
/46814340.pdf (last visited Sept. 28, 2016) [https://perma.cc/7MBY-8AH4] (archived
Sept. 9,2016).
121. Code of Criminal Procedure, supra note 120 (explaining that members of the
Muslim League objected to this on grounds of free religious exercise).
122. Abou Ramadan, supra note 26, at 110.
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3.
Countries governed by secular law and not Shari'a:A case of legal
pluralism
Tort action for talaq is probably impossible in Muslim countries
that are not governed by Shari'aand would be dismissed because talaq
was carried out in court. There should be room for a complementary
tort action, however, at least when the damages paid from the mahr do
not cover the actual harm. A defense may be raised against such action,
based on the fact that the court approved the procedure and it is
therefore final and cannot be considered a tort.
It is reasonable to assume that, in Western countries that
recognize talaq and mahr, the situation will be similar. As we have
seen, in many American civil courts, compensation is not available
following talaq if the mahr contains no compensation for the
repudiated woman; at most, compensation is limited to the sum of the
mahr. Not acknowledging a tort action for damages due to the harm
resulting from talaq confronts individualism and contradicts the rights
of the repudiated woman. 123 As noted, given the differences between
mahr and the Western prenuptial agreement, it is difficult to argue
that the woman in practice agreed, in the regular consensual sense, to
be left without adequate compensation in the case of talaq, especially
if she has lived long enough in a country espousing Western values.
Because it is not always possible to achieve adequate (rather than
symbolic) compensation in cases of talaq in American civil courts
(owing to the collision of religious and secular laws and constitutional
problems), 124 the need to provide a different mechanism, namely a

123. Cf. id. at 1890, 1920 ("In the religious divorce cases, however, any concern
about whether judicial review of religious decisions violates the Religion Clauses needs
to be balanced against a converse worry regarding whether the denial of judicial review
could result in loss of other compelling interests, such as gender equality. Courts'
abstention from adjudicating religious family law decisions may implicitly put the
government in the position of rubber-stamping religious decisions (especially religious
arbitral awards), which often times may be grounded in theological rules granting
women substantially fewer rights, or at least vastly different rights, than
men ....[Cllosing the courts' doors to parties who are seeking a hearing in a neutral,
non-biased, civil forum would handicap the neutral-principles approach and take the
courts back to a strict non-justiciability regime ....While the courts' concern for the
wives' welfare in these cases is admirable, the inconsistency, which results from
comparing the mahr to a premarital agreement, weakens the value (and predictability)
of the mahr decisions in guarding against gender discrimination.").
124. Falsafi, supra note 55, at 1914-27 (discussing the issue of whether parties to
religious contracts should have recourse to civil courts to resolve potential
disagreements, and examining whether civil courts have any meaningful authority
under the Religion Clauses of the Constitution to resolve religious disputes, suggesting,
within the context of religious divorce cases, that courts do have real power pursuant to
the neutral-principles approach to substantively review certain religious disputes.
Falsafi also criticizes civil courts, arguing that "[tihe mahr decisions show that when
lower courts do not understand the precise nature of a religious provision, they often
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civil-tort action, is becoming an urgent one. In the current situation,
many repudiated women cannot be awarded damages, although the
repudiation caused them enormous emotional distress and they are
incapable of achieving any economic security.
Why are women outside of Israel not using the mechanism of civil
tort claim? Is it conservatism and a fear of approaching the court
because of pressure within the community? Such pressure is liable to
cause women to abstain even from demanding the mahr.125 At the
same time, many women do not hesitate to turn to the court to demand
the division of property according to liberal family law. It is possible,
therefore, that there is not sufficient awareness of the tort option, and
that the background of the women's attorneys, in family law, makes
them less familiar with the tort option. It is also possible that women
fear the counter-argument that if mahr is recognized by the civil court,
it is valid and therefore cannot be considered a tort. The answer to this
counter-argument is that two radically different aspects of the problem
are involved. The mahr represents a prenuptial agreement (according
to some approaches) or a gift granted for entering marriage (according
to others), whereas tort laws compensate for harm caused by a certain
conduct, even if that conduct happens to be legitimate from the point
of view of family law. This is how the matter is handled in Israel, and
to some extent in Lebanon and India: the conduct is considered
legitimate according to family law, but the husband who performs it
must pay a price for it to his ex-wife for the harm caused by the
unilateral divorce. There is no dissonance in this case, but a conscious
decision that the religious act of talaq is valid from the point of view of
family law and creates a status of divorce, and even triggers mahr, but
this does not mean that no harm was caused and that civil-private law
(torts) cannot be applied to claim compensation.
This is clearly a case of legal pluralism. Legal pluralism is a law
and society issue that deals with a collision of two sets of laws. The rich
literature on legal pluralism traditionally dealt with intra-national
collisions between rules and cultures (offering a polycentric or
polymorphic concept of law in highlighting the substantial social
impact of non-statal-and not only statal-normative regimes and

choose a secular tool that bears very little resemblance to the religious article,
handicapping the judiciary's ability to reach a holding that reflects the parties'
intent ....This Article's findings suggest, however, that the reason the lower courts
render inconsistent decisions, is not because the Supreme Court's directive in Jones [v.
Wolf, 443 U.S. 595 (1979)] is inherently flawed, but rather because lower courts interpret
Jones too narrowly, leaving little room to understand the nature of the religious
provision underpinning the dispute. Thus handicapped, courts are often unable to
identify an appropriate civil legal tool to analogize to the religious article ....the Jones
majority categorically recognized the state's 'obvious and legitimate interest' in
providing a 'civil forum' where religious disputes could be resolved conclusively." Id. at
1915).

125. HuM. RTS. WATCH, supra note 58, at 95.
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exploring the role played by various private bodies in creating
them). 126 The modern literature on legal pluralism deals, for example,
with collisions of international and national rules and cultures, 127 and
8
with legal pluralism concerning multiculturalism and soft law. 12
In the present case, a new angle of legal pluralism is exploredthat of a collision between two national branches of law, both in cases
in which each branch is an agent of the state and in cases in which only
one is, the other being a private non-state agent. Indeed, in the present
case the colliding laws are civil law and religious family law, being the
religious practice, although valid according to Muslim law,
concurrently considered a tort and in some countries also a criminal
offense.

129

As noted above, in the Israeli case, explicit legislation allows
personal status to be controlled by religious law in order to preserve
the status quo, and, at the same time, considers certain types of
conduct, which are valid from the point of view of religious personal
law, such as polygamy and talaq, as criminal offenses. This legal
dichotomy distinguishes between matters of status and compensation
and regards a right as legitimate from the point of view of religious

126. See, e.g., LON L. FULLER. THE MORALITY OF LAW (rev. ed., 1969); Lisa
Bernstein, Opting Out of the Legal System: Extralegal Contractual Relations in the
Diamond Industry, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 115 (1992); Robert C. Ellickson, Of Coase and
Cattle: Dispute Resolution Among Neighbors in Shasta County, 38 STAN. L. REV. 623
(1986); John Griffiths, What Is Legal Pluralism, 24 J. LEGAL PLURALISM 56 (1986).
127. See, e.g., Peer Zumbansen, Transnational Legal Pluralism, 1 TRANSNAT'L
LEGAL THEORY 141 (2010); RalfMichaels, Global Legal Pluralism,5 ANN. REV. L. & Soc.
Sci. 243 (2009); Brian Z. Tamanaha, UnderstandingLegal Pluralism:Past to Present,
Local to Global, 30 SYDNEY L. REV. 375, 387 (2008); Paul Schiff Berman, Global Legal
Pluralism,80 S. CAL. L. REV. 1155, 1160 (2007); Oren Perez, Purity Lost: The Paradoxical
Face of the New TransnationalLegal Body, 33 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 1 (2007); Paul Schiff
Berman, From InternationalLaw to Law and Globalization, 43 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L
L. 485 (2005); William W. Burke-White, InternationalLegal Pluralism,25 MICH. J. INT'L
L. 963, 978 (2004); Andreas Fischer-Lescano & Gunther Teubner, Regime-Collisions:The
Vain Search for Legal Unity in the Fragmentationof Global Law, 25 MICH. J. INT. L. 999
(Michelle Everson, trans., 2004); Oren Perez, Normative Creativity and Global Legal
Pluralism: Reflections on the Democratic Critique of Transnational Law, 10 IND. J.
GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 25 (2003); Gunther Teubner, 'Global Bukowina': Legal Pluralism
in the World Society, in GLOBAL LAW WITHOUT A STATE (Gunther Teubner ed., 1997).
128. See, e.g., Gregory C. Shaffer & Mark A. Pollack, Hard vs. Soft Law:
Alternatives, Complements, and Antagonists in International Governance, 96 MINN. L.
REV. 706, 740 (2010); MENACHEM MAUTNER, LAW AND THE CULTURE OF ISRAEL (2010).

129. See Benjamin Shmueli, Civil Actions for Acts that Are Valid According to
Religious Family Law but Harm Women's Rights: Legal Pluralism in Cases of Collision
Between Two Sets of Law, 46 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 823 (2013) [hereinafter Shmueli
2013]. Indeed, being the religious family law conflicts with tort or criminal law is a case
of legal pluralism. The family arena can and should be adjudicated not only under family
law but also under other avenues-avenues which support a sensitive and balanced
solution to the abovementioned dilemma. See generally LEGAL PLURALISM AND SHARI'A
LAW (Adam Possamai et al. eds., 2014).
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family law, but subjects it to sanctions and disincentives under
criminal and tort law.
Acting in the spirit of legal pluralism may result in separating the
right to marry into two dimensions: status and damages. According to
this view, talaq is a tort and may be contrary to public policy, but civil
courts should not (and actually cannot) declare talaq invalid or ban
courts from recognizing Muslim law. Civil courts should not grant
sweeping recognition to talaq, with no other possible remedy for the
harmed woman (and mahr cannot be considered as compensation for
the harm resulting from talaq). Rather, they should award damages
without changing the marital status. Legal pluralism makes it possible
for the state to help oppressed women without seriously harming
religious practice. This right exists in Muslim law, but there is a price
associated with it, which makes for a successful pluralistic compromise
between colliding values, even if the religious right is incomplete in
practice.
This is not to say that a civil court in the United States or Jordan
that approves the mahr in practice approves it as a proper mechanism
that conforms to the values of modern society. There are various
reasons for recognizing the mahr, including regarding it (probably
mistakenly) as a prenuptial agreement signed willingly by the wife, or
as a gesture of comity. Other courts have rejected the mahr for public
policy and other reasons. Thus, the courts that accepted it did not
vindicate the values on which it is based. Such vindication could have
made it impossible to impose criminal or tort sanctions. It is not an
equitable or reasonable tool, but part of a system characterized by
extreme inequality to the detriment of the woman; talaq and the mahr
only make the situation worse from the point of view of the woman.
The dichotomy inherent in legal pluralism is manifest in the
recognition of the mahr for specific local reasons, together with the
option of imposing sanctions, in another domain, against the
perpetrator of talaq. It should be possible to impose tort sanctions in
the case of a unilateral divorce that caused harm, even in countries
where the property is divided according to civil family law, and the
mahr is not recognized.
Returning to the earlier example, it seems that the conduct of Adel
can be considered "extreme and outrageous" (according to the
American standard for Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress),
and, as such, an intentional tort, even in jurisdictions with not
particularly
rigid
standards.
Indeed,
talaq should
trigger
compensation, either by tort law, as a reflection of a balanced solution,
or by civil family law, if the latter succeeds in providing adequate,
rather than symbolic compensation for repudiated women. Talaq
should be considered as contrary to public policy. Western civil courts
should not necessarily declare talaq invalid or decide not to recognize
Shari'a, but monetary-pecuniary sanctions should be imposed on it.
Indeed, the religious practice of talaq should not be banned, but rather
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taxed. Civil courts should award adequate damages without changing
the marital status.
If the mahr provides adequate amounts of money in cases of talaq,
similar to the amount that the woman would have received as an
outcome of the division of property, the woman may choose not to file
an independent tort action for the actual harm she suffered. This is a
balanced solution, similar to the tort action, and even faster because
the woman need not go through a separate procedure and prove her
harm. Nevertheless, even in these cases, she should not be barred from
filing a tort claim because the compensation from the tort action is of a
different nature than that of family law. It is reasonable to assume,
however, that because the proof in the case of the mahr is easier, if the
mahr is high enough the woman may be well-advised to avoid filing a
tort claim.
But, if the mahr does not provide an adequate amount of money
in cases of talaq, a tort action for the harm should be especially
appropriate, because mahr does not compensate the woman for the
emotional distress caused by talaq. Any other solution may harm the
delicate balance between uniform laws and diverse cultures. Reliance
on religious tribunals alone, acting as arbitrators in these cases, does
not solve the problem because in most countries, both Muslim and
Western, the women are left without adequate funds in cases of
1
talaq. 30

130. Cf. Falsafi, supra note 55, at 1934-37 ("Religious arbitration, which has
historically found a very receptive home in the United States, has become the foremost
battleground for championing the cause of legal pluralism and religious sovereignty.
However, as this Article details, while it is hard to find fault in the basic idea that parties
should be permitted to structure their relationships and adjudicate their disputes based
on shared values, religious arbitration poses a number of unusual problems that renders
its execution somewhat challenging. The greatest difficulty presented by religious
arbitration involves potential clashes between a number of religious laws and standards
and certain civil protections, including many concerned with gender equality. Courts'
abilities to deal with this conflict have been limited by two constraints. First, the
Supreme Court's interpretation of the FAA [Federal Arbitration Act], directing the
judiciary to defer to arbitration decisions, has prompted courts readily to accede to the
holdings of religious arbitral bodies without paying much attention to the underlying
substantive issues that characterized the original dispute. Second, a misreading of
constitutional guidelines, including those set forth in Jones, has convinced some lower
courts that going beyond procedural review of religious arbitral awards will result in
Establishment Clause violations by impermissibly entangling the courts in doctrinal
analysis ....The third serious challenge religious arbitration poses concerns pressures
contracting parties may feel from their communities to subscribe to the authority of
religious forums ....As the survey of religious divorce cases reveals, mapping the
boundaries of the judiciary's authority over religious forums is not just a matter of
academic interest, but is vital to everyday concerns because so many Americans use
religion as an anchor for their personal relationships. As a result, if Supreme Court
guidelines are misinterpreted to deny parties to a religious agreement recourse to the
civil judiciary, or if deference to religious arbitration becomes automatic in all
circumstances, women's economic welfare, their ability to retain some form of custody of
their children, and even their right to remarry can be significantly impacted. It is crucial,
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C. Can Tort Law Indirectly Affect PersonalStatus?
When there cannot be a direct change in marital status following
the civil action, as there is in the case of talaq, the state can help
oppressed women without seriously harming the religious practice.
This right exists in Shari'a,but it carries a price tag, which makes for
a successful pluralistic compromise between colliding values, even if
the religious right is incomplete in practice.
Acknowledging tort actions for talaq may result in a separation of
the right to be married into two dimensions: status and damages. This
separation seems feasible. It may be possible to argue that such a
separation is not only a reflection of legal pluralism but also creates
harmony between religious family law, which addresses the status
aspect, and tort law, which addresses the damages. The separation
appears to eliminate the conflict between the two dimensions and
creates a more liberal and democratic society 131 by harmonizing two
disciplines of law. Because tort law is not expected to affect marital
status, the separation of the right into two aspects offers a new and
liberal solution: recourse to civil-tort law, with the understanding that
only religious family law can change personal status.
This solution, however, does not result in real harmony. To
understand why, a review of the theoretical issues concerning the
award of damages in cases in which a woman is divorced against her
will is necessary. The tort action solution appears to have developed in
stages. 132 At first, Muslim women in Israel recognized that religious
family law represented a dead end and sought a solution in a different,
liberal discipline of law. The second stage was referring to tort law.
Indeed, tort law provided the answer to an ongoing problem. But the
tort solution was not based on solid theoretical ground. Although tort
laws have existed all along, the solution was not created by the
1 33
legislature ex ante in order to complement family law.

therefore, to continue to evaluate the boundaries between religious autonomy and other
civil liberties. Perhaps, the lessons learned from this ongoing American experiment could
even help countries searching for new constitutional models or those simply looking to
undertake similar reform.").
131. For a general criticism of a wrongful look at Shari'a as a threat to human
rights, see Asifa Quraishi, What if Sharia Weren't the Enemy? Rethinking International
Women's Rights Advocacy on Islamic Law, 22 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 173 (2011); Asifa
Quraishi-Landes, Rumors of the Sharia ThreatAre GreatlyExaggerated: What American
Judges Really Do with Islamic Family Law in Their Courtrooms, 57 N.Y. L. SCH. L. REV.
245 (2013).
132. Cf. generally Oren Perez, The Institutionalizationof Inconsistency:From Fluid
Concepts to Random Walk, in PARADOXES AND INCONSISTENCIES IN LAW 119 (Oren Perez
& Gunther Teubner eds., 2006) (expanding on the idea of vagueness and vague notions
in law, some of them developed in an evolutionary way, and which can be constructive
in finding ways to cope with complex realities).
133. A similar process appears to have taken place in the area of civil actions for
refusal by Jewish husbands to divorce their wives. See, e.g., Benjamin Shmueli, What
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Does the awarding of damages in tort law affect, even indirectly,
marital status in religious family law? In theory, tort law is used here
as a second option, not as a decisive solution to the problem, and it does
not make Shari'amore liberal or more modern. Thus, tort law provides
a Solution that is not optimal, because the harmful norm is not banned,
only taxed in practice. Nevertheless, tort law contributes to harmony
between the laws and the courts, offering the best option available
under the circumstances.
Reality is somewhat more complex, however. The awarding of
damages in tort law does affect, if only indirectly, marital status by
causing tension between Western liberal tort law and Shari'a,with the
former imposing its values on the latter. For example, a Muslim
husband may act differently if he knows that divorcing his wife against
the wife's will carries a price tag, either civil (damages) or criminal
(fine or imprisonment) in nature. Tort law may, thus, deter some
husbands and direct their behavior. Recall the case of Mustafa and
Salma, described above. 134 Salma's friend Fatma, who had been
divorced against her will, cannot revert to her status of a married
woman by suing her husband, Adel; Fatma knows, however, that suing
Adel may deter Mustafa from divorcing Salma against her will.
Tort law can thus affect religious family law de facto, even if
indirectly, and only in the long term; it can also make religious state
or non-state law generally more compatible with human rights,
because, as a result, fewer husbands will divorce their wives against
their will. 135 This is especially true if the damages awarded are
sufficiently high to achieve optimal deterrence.
Note that there are cases in which tort law can affect family status
directly, more than it does in the matter of talaq, as, for example, in
the case of tort claims for refusal of Jewish husbands to divorce their
wives. In this case, the tort or contract action against the husband can
result in him eventually divorcing his wife in order not to have to pay
the compensation, where the wife renounces the compensation she was
awarded in civil court in exchange for the divorce. This is often the case
when the reason for the refusal is an attempt to extort money for the

Have Calabresi& Melamed Got to Do With Family Affairs? Women Using Tort Law in
Order to Defeat Jewish and Shari'aLaw, 25 BERKELEY J. GENDER L. & JUST. 125 (2010)

[hereinafter Shmueli 2010]; Shmueli 2013, supra note 129.
134. See supra Section IV.A.
135. As noted, it is possible to envision a situation in which a husband who divorced
his wife against her will would try to remarry her, but here Shari'a places a serious
obstacle: he cannot remarry his divorced wife unless she first marries another man and
divorces him. See Qur'an 2:230.
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divorce (according to Jewish law, husbands cannot be coerced into
13 6
divorcing their wives).
D. Compensation in Tort Law as a Remedy for Breach of Autonomy
A very important value that tort claims compensate for is harm to
autonomy. Unlike civil family law, which divides the property in an
equitable manner, tort law compensates for the humiliation and
degradation caused by harm to the woman's autonomy.' 3 7 Not only was
she unilaterally repudiated in a degrading and humiliating way, but
she also had no means of even expressing her opinion on the matter;
no judge heard her opinion or ruled in her case. The non-institutional
form of talaq seriously harms the woman's autonomy, which is
sufficient to order her husband to pay compensation for it. As noted,
the form and result of talaq and mahr together compound the already
unequal and inferior status of the woman.
It is possible to argue that the autonomy of the husband is also
harmed if the sting is removed from the religiously legitimate act he
performed, and in practice makes it quite difficult for him to carry it
out because of its civil price. But, it is important to bear in mind that
the husband has a choice, which means that he has autonomy, even if
it is limited to some degree, compared with the complete lack of
autonomy of the woman. His choice is between the "fast track" of talaq
(which saves him filing a divorce action in Shari'a court, litigation,
hiring a lawyer, and proving grounds for divorce), and the "standard
track" of filing such an action, with all that it implies. Unlike criminal
or family laws, which do not recognize religious norms such as talaq,
tort laws do not explicitly forbid performing the act. Rather, the
financial disincentive means that the husband is faced with two
alternatives. The first is to divorce his wife unilaterally, on the fast
track, in which case he must pay some sort of a price. He can purchase

136. See Shmueli 2013, supra note 129, at 854; Benjamin Shmueli, Post Judgment
Bargaining (With a Conversation with the Honorable Judge Prof Guido Calabresi), 50
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1181 (2015).

137. For the legal importance of harm to autonomy from various points of view, see
generally CA 2781/93 Da'aka v. Carmel Hospital 53(4) IsrSC 526 (1999) (Isr.) (Israeli
ruling that recognized, for the first time anywhere in the world, harm to autonomy as a
basis for separate compensation under tort law, without a necessary connection to other
types of harm); ELIZABETH ANDERSON, VALUE IN ETHICS AND ECONOMICS 167, 217-18

(1993) (explaining that when there is no effective range of choices in the market, and a
substantial repertoire of valuation options cannot be ensured, and freedom or autonomy
cannot be achieved); Tsilly Dagan & Talia Fischer, The State and the Market -A Parable:
On the State's Commodifying Effects, 3 PUB. REASON 44, 54 (2011) (discussing "the
autonomy critique" concerning issues of commodification of rights, and focusing on the
"resulting deprivation of choice, and its adverse effect on the choosing subject's choicemaking capacity"); Nili Karako-Eyal, Has Non-U.S. Case Law Recognized a Legally
ProtectedAutonomy Right?, 10 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 671 (2009) (presenting breach of
autonomy as a key parameter in different issues, mostly tort, in non-U.S. countries).
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his comfort at the expense of his wife if he compensates her for the
severe harm she sustains. Indeed, after choosing this mode of behavior
he has no choices left. If the husband does not want to pay the price, or
cannot, the second option is that he can opt for the regular
institutionalized way, allowing his wife to make her voice heard. Do
not forget, however, that this situation is still a difficult and unequal
one for women according to many religious legal systems, including
Shari'a.138 Therefore, no restriction is imposed here on the right to
divorce, but only on the mode of its execution.
E. Summary: Is Tort Action Possible, or Only the Application of Civil
or Religious Family Laws?
Table 2: Decision chart regarding whether a tort claim for the
damages of talaq is possible, or whether there is only a choice between
applying the mahr, as part of religious Muslim law, and dividing the
property according to secular-liberal family law
Is Shari'a state
law?
Yes, in all areas of
law
(e.g.,
Saudi
Arabia and several
Persian Gulf states)

Is a tort claim for the damages of talaq
allowed?
No. Only the mahr is applied.

138. Harm to autonomy is relevant especially when there is inequality between the
parties, including economic inequality. See, e.g., MICHAEL WALZER, SPHERES OF JUSTICE:
A DEFENSE OF PLURALISM AND EQUALITY 100 (1983) (presenting an aspect of the absence
of choice that focuses on extreme monetary gaps between the parties, which can make
the poorer and weaker sectors commodify their personal resources; this can create a
serious distributive problem and make the transaction involuntary); Margaret Jane
Radin & Madhavi Sunder, Introduction: The Subject and Object of Commodification, in
RETHINKING COMMODIFICATION 11 (Martha M. Ertman & Joan C. Williams eds., 2005)
("Unequal distributions of wealth, make the poorest in society, with little to offer in the
market place, more likely to commodify themselves-their bodies for sex, their
reproductive capabilities, their babies, and parental rights.").
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Is Shari'a state
law?
Yes, but only in the
area
of personal
status, in this case
for Muslim couples
Lebanon, and India)
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Is a tort claim for the damages of talaq
allowed?
Yes, a tort claim should be possible in
parallel with the mahr.
In Israel, a separation is enacted between the
legitimacy of talaq as part of Shari'a,as state
law, and the possibility of filing a claim for
harm caused by talaq based on secular tort
law, which is also state law.
It should also be allowed in India and
Lebanon (the Druze in Lebanon enjoy an
arrangement through family law that may be
adequate without the need to resort to torts).

No
(Western
countries, as well as
certain
Muslim
countries, such as
Tunisia,
Iraq,
Jordan, and Syria)

Yes, a tort claim should be possible in
parallel with the mahr or in parallel with the
division of property according to secular
family law.
In countries that recognize mahr for
the
being an agreement between
spouses, tort law provides a separate and
independent track for compensating for the
harm caused by talaq, which, even if legally
recognized and agreed upon by the spouses,
is still a severe harm to the woman's
autonomy and compensation should be
allowable for it.
Moreover, it is still appropriate to allow tort
claims even in countries where the
property is divided according to liberal
family law and the woman receives a
symbolic amount for her divorce, as in the
case of classic talaq,and despite the fact that,
in these countries, religious norms and
minority groups enjoy less consideration.
V. GENERALIZATION

A. Tort Law Provides an Indirect Disincentive to Act According to
Religiously Legitimate but Otherwise Harmful Norms in the
Family Arena
In his 2008 talk, the Archbishop of Canterbury hinted that Shari'a
should be incorporated in one form or another into state law. But,
incorporating Shari'a in Western countries raises problems in many

.1028

VANDERBILTJOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL

LAW

[VOL, 49:989

instances. Taxing instead of banning is a solution that does not directly
confront oppressive religious practices but enables tort law to act in the
private arena and indirectly deters members of the religious
communities from acts opposed to public policy. It is also a balanced
solution: the religious practice remains valid and is not challenged, but
a price is attached to it, making it, in practice, less effective. This
solution may be applicable not only in cases of talaq and mahr, but in
other cases as well, particularly where oppressive religious norms are
allowed but not officially recognized by state law.
There is extensive scholarship on Muslim law and Shari'a in
Western countries, from a variety of aspects, including family law,
talaq, and the application of the mahr in the case of immigrants to the
West who had married in Muslim countries. But there is almost no
literature on the theoretical basis for tort actions for the emotional and
monetary harms caused by talaq. Furthermore, there is not enough
literature on the possible indirect de facto deterrent effect of tort law
on religious family law, causing husbands to avoid using a legitimate
Shari'a practice. This is a common dilemma and a unique point of
contact between Western laws and Muslim law, especially at a time of
ongoing debate on the integration of the latter into the former, and
given the large migration of Muslims to Western countries in recent
years.
Admittedly, the literature has addressed Islamic family law in
Western society in general. The scholarship does not unanimously try
to integrate Shari'a into state law, and does not always offer new
models and ways of thinking. Some scholars criticize solutions in which
Western values are imposed on religious communities and offer
different solutions. The literature pointed out several problems and
criticized the integration of religious law in general and of Shari'a in
particular into state law. There have been demands for aggressive
imposition of secular, Western state laws over religious law and rules.
After presenting these works below, this Part shows that the tort
solution proposed here does not appear to be affected by these
problems, but on the contrary, helps solve them.
Jamal Nasir argued that, despite the differences between Western
liberal societal-civil law and Islamic law, Shari'a laws also defend
women's rights, and that Muslim women have far greater power and
more rights than are commonly perceived and enjoy full autonomy as
39
far as their property is concerned.1
Abdullahi An-Nai'm claimed that, although Shari'a law has
historically held in different states, some of these states have often

139. JAMAL J. NASIR, THE STATUS OF WOMEN UNDER ISLAMIC LAW AND UNDER
MODERN ISLAMIc LEGISLATION 1-2 (2d ed. 1994).

2016J

TAX DON'T BAN

1029

implemented secular law as well. 140 She noted that family law that is
governed by Shari'ais resistant to change because it is one of the ways
41
in which Muslims identify themselves.'
John Esposito attacked the notion that the authority that dictates
what constitutes fundamental human rights is well-established. 142
Some refer to a secular, Western, liberal authority, but Esposito argued
that it is not necessarily clear why Western liberal societies should
have a monopoly on defining human rights. To achieve Western ideals
without having to answer this enormous question, it is useful to resort
43
to Islamic reasoning and rationales in order to change Islamic law.1
Esposito advocated methods for reforming modern law and argued that
legal reform would be effective only to the degree that it is accepted by
the Muslim community. 144 Therefore, reforms must use Islamic
rationales that can be seen as advancing Islamic law rather than
intruding upon it. 145
Andrea Btichler presented an array of ideas for dealing with the
conflict between Shari'a and Western law in secular Western
nations. 146 According to her, there are conflicts in places such as
Europe, where people often have an almost automatic negative
reaction to what they perceive as political arguments based on
religion. 147 Bichler explored the distinction between culture and
religion: if Shari'a is a religious mechanism but is mostly a cultural
phenomenon, the state should not treat it neutrally. She made the case
for pluralism, arguing for the adoption of multiple legal systems and
mentioning some of the dangers. She argued further that the way to
deal with the conflict between Shari'a and Western laws, which has
become more pronounced with growing mobility and immigration on
the one hand and the increasing secularization of some Western
nations on the other, is to "reincorporate religion into its civil and social
structures, making religion part of the modern secular society it
understands and proclaims itself to be.' 148 According to Biichler, legal
pluralism is a plausible outcome, given the decrease in normative
societal consensus. 149 Nevertheless, no single idea can relieve a
universal tension between Western and Shari'a systems because

140. ISLAMIc FAMILY LAW IN A CHANGING WORLD, supra note 6, at 17 (explaining

that family law has traditionally been governed by Shari'awhile most other aspects of
civil law have been governed by state law).
141. Id. at 17-18.
142. JOHN L. ESPOSITO, WOMEN IN MUSLIM FAMILY LAW (2d ed. 2001).

143. Id. at 127.
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. BUCHLER, supra note 12, at 7.

147. Id. at 11.
148. Id. at 7.
149. Id. at 19.
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Western systems are themselves diverse. 150 Bfichler presented
different theories based on which it is possible to adopt legal
pluralism. 151 One theory is that the only real law is that made by the
state. 152 In this sense, the normative values of the people of the state,
at least in a democracy, create that law. 153 If one adopts this view and
believes that the legal fabric should incorporate all regulations, the
state should recognize the existence of different regulatory norms
(private family law, in this instance). 154 As demonstrated above in
relation to talaq and mahr, and unlike in cases such as the burqas in
France, a balanced pluralistic solution is possible with the assistance
of civil tort law and the division of the right into status and damages,
which does not require a sharp and clear determination of which set of
laws governs.
Christian Joppke and John Torpey presented several examples of
how Western countries have responded to Islam and analyzed the
barriers to conflict resolution. Some of these barriers include
secularization (and therefore reduced respect for religion generally),
the religious establishment, and the incorporation of church functions
into the state. 155 The authors argued that the Western legal system

150. Id. at 21 (explaining that different ideas of state identity have significant
effects on the ability to achieve pluralistic resolutions). French secularization relegates
religion to an entirely private sphere and exerts strong pressure for assimilation. Id. at
21, 24. In Germany, by contrast, identity is built upon common ethnicity. Id. at 21.
Pluralism centers on the question of whether to apply foreign or domestic family laws. It
cannot be ignored that law affects culture. Id. at 27. Some countries try to address the
conflict by treating residents of a country differently from those who are there
temporarily. Id. at 36-38. In our case, when Muslim couples reside in a Western state,
this solution does not apply. Cf. JOPPKE & TORPEY, supra note 9, at 17-25 (discussing
the differences between Germany, France, Canada, and the United States) The authors
explain that in Germany, the right to religious practice is well protected, but the church
establishment prevents Islamic institutions from obtaining legal, public status as
corporations. Id. at 19. France adopted almost the opposite approach. France, a declared
secular nation, with no religious establishment, made the wearing of burqas illegal in
2010, a move often seen as restricting individual religious practice. France considered
the wearing of burqas "a sign of subjugation [and] of debasement," and thus incompatible
with its liberal ideals. Id. at 21. Some attempted to impose liberal values on Islamic
practices by arguing that the practice of wearing burqas was anthropologic and cultural,
not actually religious. Id. at 25. The approach in Canada has been different. Canada
stems from a "founding nation," it retains a watered-down establishment and has a
multiculturalism policy that actively attempts to accommodate Islam. The result,
however, has created much conflict as Muslims seek to implement Shari'a in Canada in
private matters. Id. at 85-86. In contrast, the United States has neither an official
multicultural policy nor an establishment. Instead, it applied its Free Exercise Clause of
the First Amendment to facilitate Muslim integration. Because religion is held to be a
non-legal matter, politics has not reached the level it might have owing to negative public
sentiment following the September 11, 2001, attacks. Id. at 87.
151. BUCHLER, supra note 12, at 74.
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. JOPPKE & TORPEY, supranote 9.
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should withdraw from ruling on substantive issues in order to avoid
stepping on the toes of religion, and noted that the state cannot treat
conflicts created by Muslim immigration neutrally. 156
According to Melanie Reed, many of the tensions between Western
and Islamic legal systems have to do with the belief, in many Islamic
legal systems, that rights are inherently coupled with moral
obligations and thus cannot be granted by the state. 157 Reed objected
to the notion that Western ideals should displace the values or rights
of other societies. 158 She argued that generally the evolution of human
rights happens internally-within Muslim society in this case-not
through external pressure, 159 especially given the fact that, at times,
there is nothing fundamentally at odds between Shari'a and Western
understandings of human rights. 160 Some have argued that the belief
that Shari'a is the basis for family law in different legal systems is a
farce, and that family law is based on other, state-made principles,
which means that liberal change is accomplished by affecting the
political human agents through which state power flows. 161 According
to Reed, a liberal society should not seek to impose its moral values on
other societies, because imposition itself is inconsistent with the moral
values of a liberal society. 162 A reluctance to impose moral values does
not ignore the important conflict between Western and Islamic ideals,
however. 163 The Islamic world values group rights more than
individual rights, whereas Western societies tend to take the opposite
approach. 164 Islamic societies tend to believe that the individuals'
obligations to other individuals take precedence over individual

156. Id. at 3.
157. Melanie D. Reed, Western Democracy and Islamic Tradition: The Application
of Shari'ain a Modern World, 19 AM. U. INT'L L. REv. 485, 492-93 (2003).
158. Id. at 486.
159. Id.
160. IsLAMIc FAMILY LAW IN A CHANGING WORLD, supra note 6, at xii, 3 (arguing

also that instituting liberal changes in Muslim countries requires motivating people
inside the country, not imposing external pressure directly. This source relates to
Western influence on Muslim countries, and the author mentions that Islamic law
derives its authority from the state, not from the understanding of Shari'ajurisprudence,
allowing Islamic countries to inch closer to other legal systems. Islamic countries have
chosen, through the state, to abide by international obligations and treaties. All Islamic
societies now live under "constitutional" systems that require respect for a certain level
of rights. Even if the countries do not act according to these principles, they have
expressed that these principles bind them. Acting according to Shari'a, by contrast,
would require virtual political and economic isolation from the rest of the world. It seems
that these arguments may also be relevant to our proposal of how to influence Muslims
living in Western countries).
161. Id.
162. Reed, supra note 157, at 491 ("A government that allows public morals to
inform positive laws adheres more closely to international law notions of human rights
than a government that imposes morality from above.").
163.

Id. at 487-88.

164. Id. at 487-89.
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rights. 165 In Islamic cultures, rights are inherently interconnected
with these obligations such that states cannot grant or take away
rights. 166 Such a system precludes a "full realization of individual
rights. '167 Therefore, Reed argued that many of the tensions between
Western and Islamic legal systems (the tension discussed in the
present Article being one of them) have to do with the belief of Islamic
legal systems that the state cannot grant rights and that rights are
inherently coupled with moral obligations, whereas Western societies
tend to focus much more on individualization. These two ideals may be
incompatible in some areas.
Mohammad Fadel addressed the possible conflict between
cultures and laws, and presented methods for reconciling Western law
with Muslim law by creating remedies that may have a higher chance
168
of appearing neutral to adherents of Shari'a.
The literature has also dealt with Islamic family law in Western
society regarding specific issues such as Islamic divorce law, 169 as well
as aspects of the Islamic marriage contract (mahr),170 and unilateral
divorce (talaq).171 Nathan Oman suggested that a greater focus on the
context of contractual relations, like mahr, may be used to
172
pluralistically apply Western contract law to Shari'acontracts.
But the dilemma of a possible clash between Western and Muslim
cultures has not yet been addressed from the point of view of intrafamilial civil actions. It appears that the intersection of laws and
cultures in this regard is unique, and the use of tort law may reflect a
balanced, if not perfect, compromise. One can generalize and learn
from this balanced and delicate way of coping with religious life,
especially minorities and immigrants in Western and Muslim
countries where Shari'ais not dominant.

165.

Id. at 493.

166. Id. at 494.
167. Id. at 504.
168. See generally Mohammad Fadel, Islamic Law and American Law: Between
Concordanceand Dissonance, 57 N.Y. L. SCH. L. REV. 231 (2012-13).
169. See, e.g., AHMED SHUKRI, MUSLIM LAW OF MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE (2009);
JULIE MACFARLANE, ISLAMIC DIVORCE IN NORTH AMERICA (2012); INTERPRETING

DIVORCE LAWS IN ISLAM (Rubia Mehdi et al. eds., 2012); Mohammad H. Fadel, Political
Liberalism, Islamic Family Law, and Family Law Pluralism, in MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE
IN A MULTICULTURAL CONTEXT: RECONSIDERING THE BOUNDARIES OF CIVIL LAW AND

RELIGION 164 (Joel A. Nichols ed., 2012).
170. See, e.g., THE ISLAMIC MARRIAGE CONTRACT (Asifa Quraishi & Frank E. Vogel
Eds., 2008); Emily L. Thompson & F. Soniya Yunus, Choice of Laws or Choice of Culture:
How Western Nations Treat the Islamic MarriageContract in Domestic Courts, 25 WIS.
INT'L L.J. 361, 373-74 (2007) (offering a survey of the difficulties that Muslims face in
Western courts, specifically with regard to mahr and talaq).
171. See, e.g., Katayoun Alidadi, The Western JudicialAnswer to Islamic Talaq:
Peeking Through the Gate of Conflict of Laws, 5 UCLA J. ISLAMIC & NEAR E. L. 1, 6-18
(2006) (comparing Belgian and U.S. approaches to recognition of talaq).
172. Oman, supra note 84, 599-605.
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In contrast to what emerges from some of the critiques described
above, tort action rarely results in a change in status. As explained,
tort action can have a true effect indirectly, in the future. Therefore,
these critiques are less strong than in other issues (e.g., banning
burqas in France or tort or contract actions for refusing to divorce in
Jewish law). The tort action solution is preferable to inaction because
it does not directly harm the right itself. In this case, awarding
damages instead of banning the act is an appropriate solution to the
dilemma, consistent with the spirit of legal pluralism.
The dividing line between culture and religion is not always sharp
and clear. Protection of culture is important, 173 and the question is
whether secular-civil law should take up this duty. Biichler defined
cultural identity as the sense of belonging to a community and the
safety associated with such belonging. 174 Because religious beliefs
affect culture, it is not always clear where culture ends and religion
begins. 175 Should tort law be independent in considering these cases?
Should it overrule religious family law in case of conflict between the
two? Or is it a question of reaching some harmony between the two
disciplines of law, so that liberal civil law puts the finishing touches on
non-liberal religious family law by supplying remedies in the form of
damages only, whereas religious family law still has exclusivity in
determining status (married or divorced)?
In a global sense, and from a general perspective, tort law fills a
vacuum. It functions as a state control, distinct from religious state or
non-state control, but in a way that harmonizes with the other forms
of control and does not breach the legal status quo. This is legal
pluralism: Muslim husbands can still divorce their wives against their
will, but, given the secondary remedy, which consists of damages that
may be awarded for this act, the act may cost money and therefore tort
law may provide a disincentive for committing it. Because Shari'a
courts, at least in Israel, agree that this conduct is not prohibited
(although not desirable either), they do not challenge secular tort law
on this point, and each discipline handles its own matters.
The tort solution appears to be a good compromise. It is true that
the religious right is left incomplete (or less effective) and weakened
because of the threat of exposure to a fine, imprisonment, or tort
liability; in other words, exercising the right has a price attached to it.
Is it correct to impose liberal values and, in this way, harm religious
values, norms, and practices? Liberal values assist oppressed women
against their powerful husbands, but the freedom of religion is itself
an independent and important value, not only in countries where it is

173. BCHLER, supra note 12, at 13.
174. Id.
175. Id. at 17. Cf. JOPPKE & TORPEY, supranote 9, at 5 (distinguishing religion from
culture and arguing that religion can be dealt with neutrally, but culture cannot).
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a right granted by the state but also in countries where it is a private
right, protected by the state. Indeed, freedom of religion is a protected
value in countries that maintain a strict separation between church
and state. 176 It is also important to mention that Muslim women
entering a religious marriage know in advance that their husbands
have the religious authority to divorce them against their wills.
Clearly, this is not a necessary step in Muslim marriage, and every
woman hopes it will not happen to her. But in some societies, even if
she lives in a Western country, she has no choice but to marry
according to Shari'a, for cultural reasons. Note also that by
acknowledging tort actions for talaq, especially when family law leaves
the woman with only the mahr, liberal law also compromises its values.
The reason for this is that, by the court awarding a symbolic sum and
not directly confronting the religious practice, this harmful practice is
not abolished and may continue, although for a price. Thus, the law
may convey the message that liberal society accepts these harms and
does not try to abolish them, but merely taxes them.
Still, it is better than declaring talaq invalid. This appears to be
the best compromise that can be achieved. Any other solution may not
be efficient and may be harmful in a different way. Divorcing a wife
against her will is a tort and may be contrary to public policy, but
Western civil courts should not declare talaq invalid, as they
sometimes do, 1 77 or generally ban courts from recognizing Shari'a in
general, 178 nor should they grant sweeping recognition to talaq, with
no possible remedy for the harmed woman. Rather, they should award
damages, without changing the marital status, even if the property
was distributed according to liberal family values, because talaq has
been acknowledged and the woman is emotionally harmed. Any other
solution may damage the delicate balance between laws and cultures,
human rights, and freedom of religion.
Using the tort mechanism does not create harmony between
Shari'a and tort law, but merely a compromise. Even if this
compromise partially harms religious law, it appears balanced, and the
harm may be inevitable in an era of human rights. This is especially
true in countries where religious family law is a state agent, but it is
true also in countries where religious family law is not a state agent,
but where secular law respects religious law and courts operate as
arbitrators, preserving the separation of church and state. The
presumption is that Shari'a cannot be changed and made more liberal,

176. Id. at 17.
177. See, e.g., Shikoh v. Murff, 257 F.2d 306, 309 (2d Cir. 1958) (declining to
recognize the validity of unilateral divorce, where a Muslim man carried out the divorce
inside New York rather than in a foreign country).
178. See, e.g., 5 Kan. Law & Prac., Code of Civ. Proc. Anno. § 60-5101 (5th ed.)
(attesting to a movement in several states to constitutionally or statutorily ban courts
from recognizing Shari'a).

20161

TAX, DON'T BAN

so talaq remains legitimate according to Shari'a,and so does the mahr,
even if the outcome of talaq and mahr combined is often a humiliated
and harmed woman, with no remedy in religious family laws. The tort
action does not directly change marital status, and it retains some
distinction between the laws and the courts.
This Article examined one interaction between civil and religious
family laws. It presented a desirable model of the type and extent of
tort law intervention in the family arena. Tort action may be leveraged
to obtain the primary remedy regarding status, and in this way shape
religious family law along liberal lines by directing spouses in different
countries to reconsider their harmful acts. Tort law conveys the
message that, when the outcome of religious-family law is not
compatible with individualism and liberal human rights with regard
to status, it seeks to eliminate harmful practices by awarding damages,
even at the cost of some confrontation with religious family laws and
courts, within certain limits; this is a relatively gentle confrontation,
however, because the state does not abolish the religious practices, but
rather only uses civil means to induce powerful members of the
minority sector not to act in ways that are harmful to their spouses.
If so, using tort actions may reduce the harmful religious
phenomena for the benefit of individualism and human rights by
providing a disincentive to powerful persons-usually the husbandsto commit harmful religious practices, knowing that, although these
practices are not banned in family law, they have a significant cost in
tort law. This is the general lesson that can be drawn from this case
study.
Should this be the role of tort law? The starting point and the key
presumption is that the common good 179 in the present case dictates
that the state should provide maximum protection against abuse of
religious rights without-insofar as possible-directly confronting
communities by invalidating their religious practices. Such
confrontation can indeed be made through public law; private law (and
tort law within it), however, operates in some circumstances and tries
to make the best of the problematic situation, for the benefit of
individualism and human rights. The challenge, therefore, is to achieve
a balance between the need to protect the religious sphere, especially
that of minorities, from government intervention, and the need to
ensure that the religious practices in the family arena do not become a
tool for oppression.
The true challenge is to carry out this move within the boundaries
of private law, without resorting to dramatic action within public law,
which might outlaw certain religious laws or reduce the leeway of

179. See, e.g., Martin Rhonheimer, The Political Ethos of ConstitutionalDemocracy
and the Place of Natural Law in Public Reason: Rawls's 'PoliticalLiberalism' Revisited,
50 AM. J. JURIS. 1 (2005).
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religious courts operating in some of the countries by virtue of law, as
state agents, and in others as private courts, within an arbitration
framework.' 80 Naturally, measures in private and public law can also
be taken in parallel, and there is no need to choose one or the other,
but a gentle solution that avoids direct confrontation is more likely in
the area of private (tort) law, as shown here, and, in some cases, in
contract law. 18 1
To generalize the above analysis, this Article proposes the use of
civil, private, and secular legal tools-and not only the tools of family
laws-for handling intra-family cases, in order to gently shape
religious norms in Western liberal societies. 182 Indeed, it is not a trivial
matter that the family issues are being adjudicated not only under
family law, but also under other laws. A pluralistic legal system
requires multiple venues so that not only family litigation but also tort
and contract actions can gently help bridge Western norms and
conservative religious practices, shape these practices, and indirectly
bring about change for the welfare and protection of vulnerable parties,
without seriously harming tradition, identity, and cultural diversity.
The long-term effects of such a solution are subject to speculation.
Could frequent use of tort action affect the content of religious law over
time? Will there be a real deterrent for Muslim husbands like Mustafa
to act according to their religious laws because of the "threat" of the
price exacted by tort law? Do the different normative systems within a
single-state apparatus operate with relatively little friction and not
affect one another at all?
B. Using a Soft Law Solution: Tort Law as a Type of Alternative for
CriminalizingReligious Intra-FamilialNorms
In some countries, religious norms that harm one's spouse are
considered criminal offenses. For example, criminal legislation
regarding talaq was mentioned above.' 8 3 Similar legislation also exists
against bigamy and polygamy.' 8 4 In other countries there is no such
legislation because the law does not want to ban religious behavior

180. For different models and proposals to handle oppressive religious norms in the
public law arena, see AYELET SHACHAR, MULTICULTURAL JURISDICTIONS: CULTURAL
DIFFERENCES AND WOMEN'S RIGHTS (2001). See also HUM. RTS. WATCH, supra note 58,
at 12 (Human Rights Watch organization trying to change women's status in Lebanon:
"Reform discriminatory provisions governing women and men's access to divorce in Shia
and Sunni personal status laws including by ... abolishing a Muslim husband's
unilateral right to divorce at will outside a courtroom").
181. As in the case of refusal to divorce under Jewish law, in which women refused
a divorce bring both tort and contract actions. See generally Shmueli 2013, supra note
129.
182.

Cf. LEGAL PLURALISM AND SHARI'A LAW, supra note 129.

183. See supra Subsection IV.B.2.
184. See, e.g., Penal Law, 5737-1977, SH No. 864, art. 176 (Isr.).
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using its heaviest instrument: criminal law. But, even in countries
where such offenses are on the books, it is difficult to find instances of
indictments for practicing religious norms. This is because the state
avoids direct confrontation through the criminal justice mechanism
with members of religious communities who behave in accordance with
the norms of their religion. It seems that in such cases it would be
convenient for the state to impose the burden of creating a negative
incentive against these acts on the shoulders of those injured most
directly thereby: the less powerful spouses, who are generally the
wives. As noted above, 18 5 the same dichotomy is at the basis of the old
status quo in Israel, dating back to Ottoman rule and later to the
British Mandate (which had to accommodate various religions),
namely that these actions are permitted by personal religious law but
constitute a criminal offense. Because there is almost no enforcement
of these laws at the criminal level, the woman plaintiff "does the job"
for the state: a financial disincentive is provided, use of the
cumbersome criminal law is avoided, there is no criminal tagging, and
the burden of taking action is on the woman. It is possible to argue
about the justification of this move and whether or not it is a form of
privatization, but that is a discussion beyond the scope of this Article.
Given that the same may be happening not only in Israel but
elsewhere, tort actions for talaq should be considered favorably in other
countries, as proposed in this Article. This is certainly preferable to the
current situation in which, on the one hand, there are not enough
incentives to prevent performing talaq in accordance with family law,
and, on the other hand, criminal offenses are either not legislated or, if
legislated, are not enforced.
The coexistence of the two tracks-the criminal (even if not
sufficiently applicable) and the tortious-creates disincentives for
acting according to harmful religious norms. One side of the coin is that
anyone who wishes to perform these acts must take into account that,
even if they are not prohibited under family law, they have a civil and
criminal price. The other side of the coin is the rationale behind the
options available beyond family law. Whoever wishes to perform these
religious acts must understand that, even if his religion allows him to
do so, and even if the law of the state does not prohibit it, the law
expresses its displeasure with these norms, because weighed in the
balance is not only the religious freedom of the perpetrator of the act,
but also the severe harm caused to those who suffer from it. Even if
religion allows the use of certain norms, the state still has a duty to
suppress them in practice because they trample the rights of other
members of the same community. It is legitimate to fight these norms
indirectly. Taxing rather than banning the religious practice is a form

185. See supra Subsection TV.B.2.
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of legal pluralism, and it is both balanced and efficient under the
circumstances.
If one can accept this understanding of the offense of divorcing a
woman against her will or of polygamy, which has been enacted in
many countries despite the fact that the norms are permitted under
religious personal law, and despite the fact that some states recognize
their legitimacy (including states where there is a separation of church
and state), there is no reason not to accept this understanding also with
regard to civil claims. The reason to accept civil actions may even be
stronger, because such actions are less harmful to the community as a
whole and to the individual (the husband) than using the criminal law
system.
C. Does the Use of Tort Law Create a DistributionalProblem?
It is possible to argue against using tort law to exact a toll for
practicing harmful religious norms (talaq, polygamy, or refusal to
divorce) from the standpoint of distributive justice. One may argue
that, if the sanction is monetary and not criminal (say, imprisonment),
rich husbands may be able to pay the tax and not be deterred to
perform these acts, whereas poorer ones have no choice and must
renounce them or be imprisoned. This is a correct argument, although
it can be made with reference to the criminal process as well, which
often results in a fine and not in imprisonment. Moreover, some rich
husbands will be deterred by monetary sanctions because negative
financial incentives, such as fines and tort compensation, have a
deterrent effect on the rich as well. Finally, despite a possible
distributive problem, the outcome is by orders of magnitude preferable
to the current situation, where all the women are oppressed and there
is no way of helping even a portion of them.
It is hoped that the effect caused by a tort claim will be intense
and will have a broad social impact on all husbands, including the rich
ones, who consider resorting to religiously acceptable norms that
severely harm their wives' rights. Recall that usually these husbands
have the alternative of acting through the Shari'acourt (although their
choices are narrowed when it is possible to initiate a tort action against
them), whereas the women have no choices at all, and their autonomy
is severely harmed.
D. Is There Justificationfor Tort Law to Divide the Property
Differently than Was Decided Based on Family Law?
In practice, every tort claim filed in the course of a divorce conflict
divides the property differently than has been ordered based on family
law. It is possible to argue that tort law interferes with a different set
of laws and inappropriately changes the situation within that system.
But this is not to say that therefore the claim ought not to be filed as
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long as independent tortious grounds exist for it. This is the situation
in cases of other torts, some of which interact with family law more
18 6
than others.
Indeed, all civil actions against spouses or ex-spouses relate in
some way to family affairs,but not all of them relate to family law. For
example, tort actions for violence, libel, slander, and abuse do not
create a conflict of laws and jurisdictions, although the damages
awarded can provide a bargaining chip for divorce, and in this way
affect family law indirectly.1 8 7 But not all civil actions that produce
this type of interaction create a conflict between the laws and the
courts. For example, civil actions for child abduction or violations of
visitation rights rely on findings and decisions based on family law,
after which tort or contract law determines whether the violator is a
tortfeasor or has breached a contract.18 8 These actions assist family
law in enforcing decisions and provide an incentive to spouses or exspouses to adhere to judicial decisions.18 9 They complement family law
where it lacks the appropriate means to handle damages that occurred
because of a violation of family law agreements and judgments.
For example, a parent whose child has been abducted can go to
court based on private international law to demand the return of the
child, and even ask for reimbursement of some of the expenses. But, he
cannot achieve full compensation under family or international law for
the financial and emotional harm that the abduction caused him. This
he can accomplish only under tort or contract law. 190 Similarly, a
parent who violates the visitation agreement with the other parent, or
the agreement ordered by the court, is open to a court action to change
the arrangement, and even to an action of contempt of court, which can
result in a jail sentence or a fine to be paid to the state treasury (rather
than to the damaged party). But, if the harmed parent wishes to
receive compensation for his damages, he must turn to tort law. 191 In
these cases, tort law is complementary: it intervenes in family law
precisely where it can provide assistance, and where family law is
helpless. Naturally, the more complex intra-familial actions are those
in which there is a serious clash between family and civil law and
between the jurisdictions (between religious and civil courts), or where
civil-secular rules threaten to undermine religious autonomy. But it is
not appropriate to distinguish between the various categories of intra-

186. See Shmueli 2010, supra note 133, 141-55.
187. Id. at 141.
188. Id. at 142-44.
189. Id.
190. See Rhona Schuz & Benjamin Shmueli, Between Tort Law, Contract Law, and
Child Law: How to Compensate the Left-Behind Parentin InternationalChild Abduction
Cases, 23 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 65, 128 (2012) (presenting a few models for
compensating the left-behind parent in cases of child abduction).
191. See generally, Shmueli 2010, supra note 133, at 143.
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familial tort actions. Tort law must apply in all cases in which harm
that can be compensated occurs. In the case of talaq, which is used in
this Article as a test case, and in other cases where there is a
problematic interaction between tort and religious family laws, tort
compensation can be viewed as an act that balances the harsh
outcomes of religious family law with the requirements of secular
individualism. 192 But the tort claim should be allowed on principle,
even according to other approaches, as long as the tort track is
independent and it is possible to identify a tortious breach of obligation
that creates a harm.
VI. CONCLUSION

Some religious practices, such as talaq, are at times valid
according to religious family law, but at the same time seriously harm
individualism and the rights of the wife in a system that is already
iniquitous and places the woman in a position of inferiority.
The present Article analyzed civil actions for talaq in cases where
mahr leaves the repudiated wife with a small amount of money. Its
uncompromising point of view is that a Muslim woman who was
unilaterally divorced against her will is entitled to damages for her
emotional distress, regardless of whether the property is divided
according to liberal family values. The Article is a case study for a
strategy to create financial incentives that indirectly defeat harmful
religious practices. The main question was whether a Western state or
a Muslim country that honors Shari'a,but whose laws are secular in
nature, should tolerate religious practices by a minority communitymigrants or citizens-resulting in the powerful members of the
community causing harm to the weaker members. Often the
individuals involved are immigrants in Western countries who bring
religious norms that are unacceptable in liberal eyes. Should the state,
in the name of multiculturalism, grant cultural autonomy to these
minorities and tolerate harmful practices? Or should the state
intervene aggressively, in the name of individualism and of the human
rights of the injured party, and outlaw the religious practices that come
into direct conflict with Western norms? Alternatively, is there a third
way, involving financial disincentives imposed by the state on the
powerful members of the group intended to stifle these practices
without banning them?

192. Cf. Yifat Bitton, Feminine Matters, FeministAnalysis and the Dangerous Gap
Between Them - A Response to Yehiel Kaplan and Ronen Perry, 28 TEL Aviv U.L. REV.
(EIUNEI MISHPAT) 871 (2005) (discussing tort litigation against a recalcitrant husband
from a feminist perspective and addressing attempts to fight religious family law with
tort law).
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The answer provided by this Article is that family issues can and
should be adjudicated not only under family law but also by other
means that support a sensitive and balanced solution to the dilemmas
mentioned above. The rationale is that neither deference to religious
systems that harm vulnerable spouses nor abolishing religious norms
in the name of individualism and liberalism are balanced solutions.
These options, which fall outside of family law, advance in some form
the status of women in an iniquitous system of religious family laws in
which their status is inferior to that of men. Because religious norms
change very slowly, if at all, the law must enable additional tracks,
especially those that do not directly confront religious norms to the
point of banning them, as criminal and civil family law do by assuming
the authority to rule differently from religious courts. Tort law
precisely meets these criteria. Indeed, tort law seeks to impose a civil
price tag on harmful practices, providing a negative incentive to act
according to their religious norms. It does so without changing family
law de facto, and by softening to some degree the harsh results of
criminal law.
The literature and case law have dealt mainly with the application
of the mahr as sole payment for a repudiated Muslim woman versus
the ability to divide the property according to Western liberal values.
The possibility of a tort action for the damages created by talaq has not
been adequately analyzed or theoretically supported. Nevertheless,
this option has immense potential to both support individualism and
women's rights without directly confronting the religious norms of
minorities by enabling the woman to use the private law system of the
state to be compensated for her harms and to create a disincentive for
potential wrongdoers to act in the same manner.
Although a Muslim husband who repudiates his wife acts
legitimately under Shari'a, tort law provides the woman with a
secondary remedy: damages awarded in a secular court. Tort cannot
grant the wife the primary remedy of status, that is, to declare the act
null and void so that she remains married. The compensation reflects
a civil law that regards practices recognized as legitimate and
acceptable under religious law as tortious. Although the outcome of a
tort action cannot change the woman's marital status, religious family
law may be affected in practice, not in the case at hand, but in cases
that follow in its wake.
Tort actions for talaq are a common practice in Israel. In countries
that are governed solely by Shari'a, talaq is not considered a tort. In
countries that are not governed by Shari'a,but that honor its practices
(some Muslim and Western countries), there are solutions within state
family law, some of them enabling limited damages to be paid out of
the mahr. But there should also be room for a complementary tort
action, especially in cases in which the division of property according
to liberal values is impossible and the mahr is low, even if talaq was
either performed in court or acknowledged by the court.
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The test case presented in this Article addresses the ongoing
debate over the question of religious law becoming part of state law in
Western countries, showing how the state can confront harmful
religious practices in a sensitive way without abolishing these
practices.
To generalize, the analysis can fit different types of civil actions
against practices that are valid under religious family law but at the
same time seriously harm the rights of the more vulnerable spouse in
a minority group. The analysis shows that secular courts can serve as
a bridge between tradition and modernity by becoming involved in
religious disputes in order to protect vulnerable spouses, using
solutions other than those available in family law.
There are a few causes of action and remedies available to the civil
courts to help oppressed spouses in their fight against practices that
are legitimate according to religious law; 193 tort law is one of them.
This is true both in countries where there is separation of state and
religion (where there is civil marriage and divorce, and where religious
courts are private), as well as in countries where there is no such
194
separation and religious courts are operated by the state.
This proposed balanced solution is based on the knowledge that a
price must be paid for following legitimate but harmful religious
practices. This is in contrast to extremist positions of state nonintervention on one hand and direct confrontation with the religious
practices and norms on the other. An important aspect of religious life
in the modern state is the preservation of multiculturalism with regard
to religious practices, together with the protection for the vulnerable
parties in the family arena. The proposed solution may show the way
to implementing in a balanced manner the desire of the Archbishop of
Canterbury and allow a society that holds Western values to cope with
religious laws that are incompatible with these values. Tort law is not
a complete solution; at times, the state needs to intervene more
intensively, using other tools and sanctions. But there are times when
taxing the harmful religious practice rather than banning it is the most
balanced and efficient solution.
This middle-of-the-road strategy can fit not only circumstances of
talaq and mahr but also other cases, such as bigamy and polygamy
among Muslims and refusal to divorce among Jews, because tort law
offers a global soft solution. A solution in the spirit of legal pluralism,
which does not directly confront oppressive religious practices but
enables tort law to act in the private arena and indirectly deter

193. Cf. Talia Einhorn, Jewish Divorce in the InternationalArena, in PRIVATE LAW
AMICORUM KURT SIEHR 135, 153 (Jtirgen
Basedow et al. eds., 2000).
194. Id.
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members of the relevant communities from acting, may be successful
and balanced in other cases as well.
In western societies, divorcing a woman against her will,
polygamy, genital mutilation, and honor killing are all criminal
offenses. But each society must draw its own red lines and determine
in which cases it is sufficient to tax with monetary compensation in a
torts procedure, and in which cases it is not willing to compromise
and opts to impose criminal liability.

